

Land in Zimbabwe: past mistakes, future prospects

A report by the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group

December 2009

"It was about **land** in the beginning; it was about **land** during the struggle; it has remained about **land** today. The **land** issue in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe is not ancient history.

It is modern history."

Sir Shridath 'Sonny' Ramphal
Secretary-General of the Commonwealth 1975 – 1990¹

Contents

Acknowledgements	5
Acronyms and Abbreviations	6
Boxes	7
Timeline of Events	8
Chair's Introduction	12
Key Findings and Recommendations	15
Preface: Understanding the Legacy of Lancaster House	18
Chapter 1: Lancaster House	18
Concluding remarks	25
Chapter 2: The Impact of Land Reform	27
2.1 1980 – 1996	27
2.2 1997 – Present Day	32
Concluding remarks	38
Chapter 3: The Future: Recommendations for Recovery	40
3.1 Land reform goals	40
3.2 Britain's role in future land reform programmes	45
Concluding remarks	45
Annex A: Call for written evidence issued by the AAPP	48
Annex B: Written evidence received by the AAPP	49
Annex C: Oral evidence sessions held by the AAPP	50
Annex D: About the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group	51
References	52

Acknowledgements

The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group would like to thank the Royal African Society for providing administration for the Group and for covering some of the expenses incurred by this report's preparation and publication.

The Group would also like to thank the following individuals for their support and advice:

Mr. David Banks
Mr. John Cusworth
Mr. Richard Dowden
Mr. Chester Crocker
Mr. Gib Lanpher
Sir Kieran Prendergast
Mr. Roger Riddell
Mr. Tim Sheehy

The AAPPG is grateful to all those who submitted written evidence and those who came to Westminster to give oral evidence. They are listed in full in Annexes B and C. A number of these individuals also gave further advice.

The report was drafted by Alex O'Donoghue on behalf of the Africa APPG with editorial input from Richard Dowden. The Group's Zimbabwe inquiry steering group approved the final report.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAPPG	Africa All Party Parliamentary Group
CFU	Commercial Farmers' Union
DFID	Department for International Development
EU	European Union
FAO	United Nation's Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GMB	(Zimbabwe's) Grain Marketing Board
GPS	Global Positioning System
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MP	Member of Parliament
ODA	(UK) Overseas Development Agency (<i>chapters 1&2</i>) (Global) Overseas development assistance (<i>chapter 3</i>)
PF	Patriotic Front
PF ZAPU	Patriot Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union
RF	Rhodesian Front
SACFA	Southern African Commercial Farmers Alliance
UDI	Universal Declaration of Independent (1963)
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US(A)	United States (of America)
WFP	United Nation's World Food Programme
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZIMCORD	International Zimbabwe's Donor Conference, March 1981

Boxes

- Box 1 Background to Lancaster House
- Box 2 Section 16 of the Lancaster House Agreement
- Box 3 Sources of land resettled 1980 – 1998
- Box 4 A certificate of no interest
- Box 5 Natural Regions I-V
- Box 6 Map of Natural Regions I-V
- Box 7 Extract from Clare Short MP's letter
- Box 8 Agricultural outputs 2000 – 2007 compared to 1990's average
- Box 9 Decline in commercial agricultural production
- Box 10 British government's statement on future land reform policy in Zimbabwe
- Box 11 Land reform recommendations from the Hon. Denis Norman
- Box 12 Land reform recommendations from government of Zimbabwe
- Box 13 Land reform recommendations from the Commercial Farmers' Union

Timeline of Events

1979	May	Conservative party wins U.K. general election.
	September	Lancaster House talks begin.
	October	An impasse over land reform emerges at Lancaster House. The United States seeks to break the deadlock.
	December	Lancaster House talks end with a constitution, including a 'sunset clause' that precludes any changes to the constitution for 10 years. Land resettlement set up on a 'willing buyer- willing seller' basis.
1980	March	Robert Mugabe and ZANU PF win a decisive victory over rivals Joshua Nkomo and PF-ZAPU in Zimbabwe's first free and fair election.
1981	March	International Zimbabwe Donor's Conference (ZIMCORD) held in U.K. to raise funds for Zimbabwe.
1988	September	An ODA preliminary evaluation of the Land Reform Programme is published. The report is broadly positive.
1989		Minister for Overseas Development, Lynda Chalker MP, writes to Zimbabwean Ministers of Land and Finance to inform them that not all the aid pledged had been claimed.
	October	An article in the Economist calls Zimbabwe's land reform programme 'one of the most successful aid schemes in Africa.'
1990		President Mugabe passes the Land Acquisition Act, changing the Zimbabwean constitution. This granted the government more power to redistribute land.
1996		End of the first phase of Zimbabwe land reform. £3 - £3.5m unspent (depending on accounts)
	March	Presidential elections held in Zimbabwe. Land reform is a key issue during the campaign.

	June	Zimbabwe Ministers for Land and Local Government arrive unexpectedly in London looking to reopen the Lancaster House land settlement.
1997	May	A general election in U.K. results in change of government from Conservative to Labour.
	October	New prime minister Tony Blair meets President Mugabe at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. Blair downplays Britain's responsibility for past, infuriating President Mugabe.
	November	Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development, writes to President Mugabe invoking her Irish heritage, provoking a negative response from the Zimbabwean President.
1998	September	A donor conference is held in Harare. Inception Phase Framework Plan (IPFP) is discussed.
1999		Inception Phase Framework Plan (IPFP) receives modest support from donors, but EU and U.K. hold back from offering support without assurances from Zimbabwe that it will meet their conditions.
2000	February	MDC defeats ZANU PF in a referendum proposing changes to the constitution.
	February onwards	ZANU PF makes land repossession a central part of its election campaign.
	March	DFID publishes leaflet saying Britain will support land reform through civil society challenge fund, bi-passing the government of Zimbabwe
	April	A constitutional amendment provides for expropriation without an obligation for the state to compensate for the land.
	June	A general election in Zimbabwe. ZANU PF narrowly wins over rivals MDC.
2001	September	At the Abuja Conference a group of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers meet to

		discuss Zimbabwe. The government of Zimbabwe agrees to prevent further occupation of farm lands and restore rule of law.
	July	Finance Minister Simba Makoni publicly acknowledges economic crisis. Western donors - including the World Bank and the IMF - cut aid because of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme.
	November	Land Acquisitions Act is amended to allow re-allocation of land without the owner's right to contest.
2002	February	European Union imposes sanctions on Zimbabwe.
	March	President Mugabe is re-elected. Commonwealth suspends Zimbabwe from its Council for one year amongst reports of election violence.
	April	State of disaster declared in Zimbabwe. Food shortages threaten famine. Though the government of Zimbabwe blames drought, the UN's World Food Programme says disruption to agriculture is a contributing factor.
2006	May	Year-on-year inflation exceeds 1,000% in Zimbabwe.
2008	March	Presidential election in Zimbabwe leads to to a run-off election between President Mugabe and MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai.
	June	Morgan Tsvangirai pulls out of the run-off election citing ZANU PF violence towards MDC supporters. Running alone, President Mugabe wins the run-off election.
	July	Z\$100 billion banknote is introduced in response to official year-on-year inflation rate of 2million%.
	September	The government of Zimbabwe and MDC enter into negotiations for a power-sharing government.

	October	Annual inflation rate hits new high of 231 million% according to official figures.
2009	January	Soon after issuing a \$1 trillion note, acting Finance Minister Patrick Chinamasa announces a suspension of the national currency in order to curb inflation.
	February	Morgan Tsvangirai sworn in as Prime Minister of the unity government of Zimbabwe.
	April	National currency suspended for at least a year following the legalisation of foreign currencies.
	June	Constitutional review begins. Prime Minister Tsvangirai tours Europe and US to drum up donor support.
	July	The IMF refuses Zimbabwe a loan until it settles \$1bn debts. The government estimates it needs \$10bn in foreign aid to rebuild the economy.
	September	One year after power-sharing deal, progress is slow. MDC continues to allege persecution and violence against members. Arrival of EU and US delegations seen as signs of thaw in foreign relations. Both maintain stance on targeted sanctions. IMF provides \$400 million support as part of G20 agreement to help member states.
	October	President Mugabe calls for new start to relations with West.
	November	Commonwealth Heads of Nations meeting announces that it will offer a seat to Zimbabwe in two years if the unity government carries out a wide range of reforms.

Chair's Introduction

The power sharing agreement in Zimbabwe between President Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai signed in September 2008 has opened up a political space which may lead to a more democratic and united Zimbabwe. The agreement includes a request for external assistance with land reform. Ownership of land, a powerful motivation in the war which led to Zimbabwe's independence, remains a fundamental political issue 30 years on.

In the short term the international community must continue to focus on Zimbabwe's humanitarian needs. But at the same time, it must be recognised that Zimbabwe's humanitarian crisis has developed out of Zimbabwe's politics. If Zimbabwe is to return to a stable, functioning state that can exploit its considerable agricultural potential to the benefit of all its people, the political tensions that brought the country to where it is today must be addressed.

The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group believes that agriculture will remain the main driver of Zimbabwe's economy for the foreseeable future. We also believe that the British government has a role to play in helping restore the Zimbabwe economy by supporting a land policy that is just, based on law and benefits all Zimbabweans. We do not think this will be easy. Land in Zimbabwe and throughout much of southern Africa is an emotive issue. Despite the successful transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, there remains much bitterness about the role Britain has played in the country since colonisation – including what many indigenous Zimbabweans see as an illegitimate 'land grab' by the European settlers that created a deeply unequal society. Furthermore, Britain's failure to prevent the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Rhodesian whites in 1963 and the bitter war for liberation that ensued has continued to make relations between Zimbabwe and Britain difficult.


Recently there has been a growing belief among Zimbabweans and others that during the Lancaster House talks that led to Zimbabwe's independence Britain and the United States made promises concerning land transfer which were later betrayed. These promises, it is claimed, included specific amounts to buy out white Zimbabwean land-owners and set up black Zimbabweans as farmers, thereby righting a colonial wrong.

British and American versions of events maintain that no promises were made other than to provide substantial funding for agricultural development and land reform. These, they say, were fulfilled until President Mugabe's government began to pursue what they regarded as unworkable economic policies and allowed land to be seized without compensation. In response, Western donors cut off aid for land reform.

The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group believes that in order to move on and address the challenges of the future, these competing histories must be examined and the areas of contention addressed. We want Britain to be a positive force in the rebuilding of Zimbabwe, but if we are to contribute towards a solution then we must first scrutinise our past and work out what went wrong, where it went wrong and how to ensure that history does not repeat itself.

To this end the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group decided to carry out an inquiry to establish the following:

- a) what proposals were made and what commitments were given by U.K. and Zimbabwean representatives at the Lancaster House talks in 1979 and the early years of independence
- b) what development assistance for land reform has actually been provided to Zimbabwe since independence
- c) what impact did land reform assistance have, and what were the main factors which led to the decline in agricultural production and the continued under-utilisation of the land
- d) what land reform and agricultural policies funded by donors and implemented by the government of Zimbabwe would be most effective at increasing food self sufficiency, reducing rural poverty and establishing a vibrant agricultural sector in Zimbabwe today.



Hugh Bayley MP
Chair
All Party Parliamentary Group

Key Findings & Recommendations

The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group believes that the unity government and their power sharing agreement represents an important opportunity for Britain and Zimbabwe to rebuild their relationship and re-address the outstanding issue of land reform.

Key Findings:

1) The narrative that Britain ‘betrayed’ its promises at Lancaster House plays not only an active role, but an actively destructive role in the present politics of Zimbabwe.

2) The narrative that Britain betrayed its promise at Lancaster House has no basis as no agreement was reached on land in 1979.

During the course of our inquiry the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group received no evidence from any source that behind the scenes at Lancaster House a deal was reached and a sum of money was agreed upon for land reform that Britain later reneged on. The narrative that Britain betrayed its promise at Lancaster House has no basis.

3) Land reform in Zimbabwe has not been a total failure.

Between 1980-1985 the Land Resettlement Programme was moderately successful, despite general perceptions that it was failing. Land reform began to stall after 1985 and Britain gave no money to the programme after 1990. When the programme ended in 1996 a total of 71,000 families had been resettled.

4) Land reform during 1980s and 90s failed to address the crucial issue of the dual land tenure system.

While the Land Resettlement Programme addressed the needs of the landless poor it did little to solve the increasingly pressing issue of overcrowding in the communal land areas. No policy was put in place to standardise land tenure and abolish the dual system that discriminated against communal farmers.

5) Britain and the international community failed to recognise how vulnerable President Mugabe was to pressure from the war veterans.

By 1997 pressure in Zimbabwe began to build against President Mugabe. The hitherto benign War Veteran Association first demanded larger pensions and then, in 2000, land. President Mugabe, unable to extract provisions from Britain or the international community and desperate to remain in power agreed, allowing and even encouraging farm seizures with no compensation.

6) The Fast Track Land Reform Programme was illegal and has been catastrophic for the commercial farming sector,

The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group believes that the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), as the land seizures were officially called, is illegal under international law. The FTLRP has had a deep impact on agricultural production. From 2000 – 2008 agricultural production has fallen by 60% in real terms.

Recommendations:

1) Land in Zimbabwe should be treated as a political issue and not just an economic and development issue

While land is both an economic and a development issue, it is also a political one and any medium to long term strategy must recognise this. The chronic land inequality in Zimbabwe will continue to undermine the country's stability if it is not address.

2) It must be a priority of the British government to address the 'promises betrayed' narrative that has developed since Lancaster House in a sensitive and constructive manner.

3) The dualist system of land tenure should be replaced with a uniform land tenure system

A system whereby commercial farm owners hold title but communal farmers do not is demonstrably unfair and perpetuates poverty. The international community should support and encourage Zimbabwean stakeholders, civil society organisations and land experts to decide between government acquisition or private ownership of land.

4) Once the Government of Zimbabwe decides on the status of land tenure after the recent upheavals, Britain should reengage in a land reform programme on a multilateral, not bilateral, basis.

Though Britain has a particular obligation to Zimbabwe, the U.K. government must take steps to ensure it does not become the sole donor of any programme. By being the only donor to provide funds for land purchases during the 1980s Britain opened itself up to unfair and politically motivated criticism and ultimately became the scapegoat for President Mugabe's failing governance. Any future reengagement should be as part of a multilateral effort carried out by international organisations, with Britain as a generous donor.

A Brief Note on our Sources

Throughout the report we quote the government of Zimbabwe's submission to the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group. We received their submission in early February 2009, and as such we understand the evidence submitted represents the opinions of the ZANU PF government, not the Unity government.

The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group invited both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development to submit evidence. The departments chose to submit one reply from the Department for International Development, which was endorsed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Preface:

Understanding the Legacy of Lancaster House

Thirty years after independence both land and land reform continue to be pivotal and emotive subjects in Zimbabwe. From colonisation to independence to the Fast Track Reform Programme and the land seizures that followed, land has been not just the basis of Zimbabwe's economy but an integral part of its politics and identity.

It is in this context that we consider the Lancaster House Agreement and how it has shaped the Zimbabwean attitude towards land. In his extensive research Sam Moyo has discussed this phenomenon:

Our research suggests that the more fundamental issue that informed the liberation army leaders at the talks (and the average non-middle class Zimbabwean) was their belief that Zimbabweans should not be made to pay for the return of what they consider 'their stolen land'.²

Many Zimbabweans, and Africans, believe that at Lancaster House the British should have offered to buy-out all the white farmers in full and return all the land to black Zimbabweans. Moreover, many people today – not just supporters of President Mugabe – believe that the British did promise a stated sum at the Lancaster House talks.

This was never a political reality. In addition to a lack of necessary funds, the British government balked at the concept of compensating rebels who had supported Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the subsequent illegal government that had established itself in direct defiance of the United Kingdom.

The feeling that justice on land was denied at Lancaster House is felt strongly today, both in Zimbabwe and throughout southern Africa. During 2008's Independence Day celebrations President Mugabe launched a tirade against the British to a jubilant crowd, shouting: "Down with the British. Down with thieves who want to steal our country."³ It is clear that anti-colonial rhetoric still resonates after all these years.

Our conclusion is that 30 years after independence the narrative that Britain 'betrayed' its promises at Lancaster House plays not only an active role, but an actively destructive role in the present day politics between Britain and Zimbabwe. Convinced of this, our inquiry is not revisiting past events for the sake of it, but is returning to the events of 1979 in the sincere belief that the issue of what was or was not promised at Lancaster House has become a stumbling block for both Britain and Zimbabwe, hindering agreement about the past and preventing co-operation in the future.

The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group believes that if Britain is serious in its desire to rebuild her relationship with Zimbabwe then we have no option but to return to the events of 1979 and re-examine not only what transpired at Lancaster House but also the British approach to land reform in Zimbabwe since 1980.

Chapter One:

Lancaster House

The Lancaster House conference took place from September – December 1979 with the aim of reaching a political agreement that met the criteria set by the U.K. government and the United Nations. The bogus ‘internal settlement’ between Ian Smith and Bishop Abel Muzorewa excluded both Patriotic Front parties, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), and thus the majority of Zimbabweans.

Expectations were low. Previous attempts to reach a settlement between Britain, Ian Smith and Bishop Muzorewa’s Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Administration and the leaders of the Patriotic Front, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, had ended in failure. There was little reason to expect Lancaster House would be any different. [see box 1]

The issue of land was at the top of the agenda for both the Patriotic Front and the Smith-Muzorewa regime. The white Rhodesians, who owned 70% of the land while making up less than 1% of the population, were determined that an independent Zimbabwe would recognise their rights and that their land title would remain secure. The Patriotic Front wanted the power to redistribute land more equitably among the population, by compulsory purchase if necessary.

The Rt. Hon Lord Carrington, the U.K. Foreign Secretary in 1979, recognised the scale of the problem and the vast resources that would be needed to solve it. At a plenary session in October 1979 he stated that:

We recognise that the future government of Zimbabwe, whatever its political complexion, will wish to extend land ownership.

The British government recognises the importance of this issue to a future Zimbabwe government and will be prepared, within the limits imposed by our financial resources, to help. We should for instance be ready to provide technical assistance for settlement schemes and capital aid for agriculture development projects and infrastructure. If an agricultural development bank or some equivalent institution were set up to promote agricultural development including land settlement schemes, we would be prepared to contribute to the initial capital. The costs would be very substantial indeed, well beyond the capacity, in our judgement, of any individual donor country, and the British government cannot commit itself at this stage to a specific share in them.⁴

From the British perspective, a key provision of an independence charter was the protection of both minority and property rights. Section 16 of the draft constitution protected against compulsory purchase, thereby ensuring property rights. The document as a whole was to be bound by a ‘sunset clause’, prohibiting any amendments or alterations to the constitution for 10 years.

Box 1: Background to the Lancaster House Conference

In 1979 the white Rhodesian settlers made up less than 1% of the population and owned 70% of the land – 6,000 large scale white farmers controlled roughly 40% of the country's territory while approximately seven million black Zimbabweans were crowded into communal areas.⁵

This inequitable distribution of land ownership along racial lines was a result of decades of discriminatory laws to limit land ownership amongst the indigenous black population and reserve the best arable land for the white Rhodesian settlers.

As African nations started to gain independence in the late 1950s and 1960s, international attention turned to the racist policies in the southern African states. This focus sharpened onto Southern Rhodesia after South Africa left the Commonwealth in 1961.⁶ Independent African nations demanded that Britain take action. Britain, embarrassed by what had happened with South Africa, instituted a 'No Independence before Majority African Rule' policy.

Vehemently opposed to majority rule, the response of most white Rhodesians under their Prime Minister Ian Smith was to announce their Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965. International condemnation quickly followed, spearheaded by Britain who organised the first ever United Nations use of sanctions against its renegade colony.

At first the relatively rich former colony, propped up by apartheid South Africa, was able to withstand the sanctions. But gradually the sanctions began to have an impact, reinforcing insurgencies by the black nationalists, who were supported by neighbouring states. Constant guerrilla hit and run tactics successfully wore down the resolve of many white Rhodesians, who began emigrating to the more secure South Africa, or Britain, Australia or Canada.

Under pressure from the United States, South Africa began to withdraw its support and Ian Smith and his remaining white-Rhodesian supporters began to run out of options. In 1978 Smith entered into an Internal Settlement with the more moderate nationalist Bishop Abel Muzorewa. However, as it excluded the two largest political parties in Zimbabwe – ZANU and ZAPU – it did not represent the majority of the people, and thus was not recognised by Britain or the U.S.

But support was also fading for ZANU and ZAPU. Their allies in the region, known as the Front Line States, began to put pressure on leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe to reach an agreement and end the fighting. Nkomo, who by 1979 was 62 years old, was particularly keen to reach a settlement.

It was at this point that the newly elected British Conservative government issued invitations to all parties to attend a peace conference at Lancaster House, beginning in September 1979.

Speaking to the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group Lord Renwick, former head of the Rhodesia Department at the Foreign Office, explained: “We didn't actually negotiate the constitution in any detail at either side, we simply dumped on the table a document that epitomised the kind of classic independence constitution on the basis of which we'd granted independence in every other case, which provided protection for minorities but indisputably provided for majority rule.”⁷

Rather than land reform through widespread compulsory purchases, Britain proposed a resettlement scheme with a ‘willing buyer-willing seller’ restriction, in which the government could not acquire utilised land compulsorily, but anyone wishing to sell their land had to give the government of Zimbabwe first refusal. Under-utilised land could be compulsorily purchased. Britain told the Patriotic Front that if they agreed to this, funds would be provided to assist with the buying of land from willing sellers.

These assurances were not enough for the Patriotic Front and property rights rapidly became a sticking point at the negotiations. Patriotic Front leaders Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo were determined that land reform should not be so restrictive and that the U.K. should fund a buy-out of the white farmers. The British government were equally determined that the constitution must provide full protection of land title and minority rights. The notion of a full scale buy-out of white farmers as envisaged by the Patriotic Front was never seriously entertained by the British government, who by 1979 were heavily cutting back on public spending in the U.K., let alone in their former colonies. The idea that they would be so generous to supporters of an illegal government, some of whom were not even British, was a non-starter.⁸

The Patriotic Front felt that it was imperative that the future government of Zimbabwe be able to implement large scale redistribution of land on their own terms. ZAPU’s legal adviser at Lancaster House, Professor Reginald Austin, recalls that: “To both members of the Patriotic Front [section 16] amounted to a fundamental negation of the sovereign power to affect the most important reform an electoral victory would give them.”⁹

By October the disagreement over section 16 had become an impasse. The Rhodesian Front, led by Bishop Muzorewa, agreed to the conditions on land set out by the British. The Patriotic Front refused. The British government, frustrated at the deadlock, began to talk seriously about reaching a deal with Bishop Muzorewa and Ian Smith without the Patriotic Front.

Box 2: Section 16 of the Lancaster House Agreement

V. Freedom from Deprivation of Property

1. Every person will be protected from having his property compulsorily acquired except when the acquisition is in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and country planning, the development or utilisation of that or other property in such a manner as to promote the public benefit or, in the case of under- utilised land, settlement of land for agricultural purposes. When property is wanted for one of these purposes, its acquisition will be lawful only on condition that the law provides for the prompt payment of adequate compensation and, where the acquisition is contested, that a court order is obtained. A person whose property is so acquired will be guaranteed the right of access to the High Court to determine the amount of compensation.

In an evidence session with the Africa APPG, Lord Carrington remembered the difficulties:

*To be perfectly frank, the Conservatives had almost entered into an agreement that they would recognise the Muzorewa-Smith government if the elections would be considered free and fair. The trouble with that proposal was that neither Mugabe's nor Nkomo's party would have taken any part in the election at all, and therefore it wouldn't have been considered by anybody other than the British government and the [apartheid] South Africans to have been an authentic election.*¹⁰

The impasse led to the United States taking a more active role in the negotiations. Up to this point their position had been deliberately supportive at the negotiations, as part of Lord Carrington's desire to ensure Lancaster House was an "entirely British occasion."¹¹ Gib Lanpher, the US Foreign Service Officer who was posted to London in August 1979 as the Embassy's 'Africa Watcher', describes the US's role as "outer circle" diplomacy.¹²

Faced with a possible collapse in negotiations and a reluctance from the British government to reach a deal without the Patriotic Front, British officials and the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Sir Shridath 'Sonny' Ramphal, turned to the American Ambassador to the U.K., Kingman Brewster.¹³

For a few weeks negotiations moved to the backrooms. While some of the evidence the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group has received about these off-the-record discussions has been contradictory, what is interesting is the central themes have not. This is particular unexpected given the differing narratives that have emerged since, and the importance each narrative places on what was or was not said during these backroom discussion.

In evidence sessions with the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group both Lord Carrington and Lord Renwick played down the impasse, stating that land reform was one of many issues that the Patriotic Front and the Smith-Muzorewa camp disagreed on. When asked about the Patriotic Front threatening to walk out of the talks over the land issue, Lord Carrington replied "they were always threatening to walk out."¹⁴

Part of this approach may have been influenced by the British view towards the land issue. When talking to the Africa APPG, Lord Carrington made it clear that he saw an agreement on land as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself: "The only thing that was certainly in my mind was to find a way of getting the land problem settled so we could get an agreement about everything else."¹⁵

According to Lord Renwick, it was Robert Mugabe who was spearheading the resistance to the 'willing buyer-willing seller' proposal that had been put on the table by the British government. He recalls:

What they [Patriotic Front] were trying to do was avoid agreeing unconditionally to the independence constitution... [Joshua] Nkomo made clear to me, privately, that he couldn't see anything wrong with the independence constitution and nor could

*Mugabe. If we could make some gesture on land then he would simply accept it and Mugabe would too.*¹⁶

Even though Lord Carrington and Lord Renwick did not place too much import on the land disagreement in our evidence sessions, at the time it was deemed serious enough to turn to the Americans. Both British officials and the Commonwealth Secretary-General turned to the U.S. Ambassador to the U.K. Kingman Brewster to assist with the negotiations. Based at the U.S. Embassy in London, Gib Lanpher recalls:

*By the end of the first week of October it was pretty obvious that an impasse had been reached on various constitutional issues, and Mugabe and Nkomo were threatening to walk out. Whether real or not, both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Commonwealth Secretary General [Sonny Ramphal] contacted me suggesting it was time for the U.S. government to "intervene" in a positive way to overcome the impasse. I urgently reported this to Washington and requested instructions. Within 3 days I had a response which I was told had been cleared with Secretary Vance¹⁷ and President Carter who were both following Lancaster House closely. The essence was: If Lancaster House is successful and a new Zimbabwe emerges, the U.S. government will be generous in its support for reconstruction and development. As I recall it excluded any U.S. government funding for buying out white farmers, as in our system dollar figures are rarely, if ever, given in such commitments/pledges.*¹⁸

Despite Lord Renwick's belief that Joshua Nkomo's resistance was largely for show, evidence submitted by his legal adviser Reginald Austin to the Africa APPG suggests that Nkomo was genuinely wrestling with how to move on from the land issue:

*Between the 15th and 17th October 1979 we [PF ZAPU legal team] were called by Mr. Nkomo to assess and advice on conversations he and Mr. Mugabe were having, principally with the US Ambassador to the U.K., Kingman Brewster... Mr. Nkomo informed us that the U.S. government had...authorised its Ambassador to make it clear to the PF leaders that 'the Americans would help with land development.' Mr. Nkomo understood that this meant in principle the U.S.A. would contribute sufficient funds to make a real land reform process possible.*¹⁹

However Professor Austin is clear that the Americans did not make the Patriotic Front explicit promises, nor were figures agreed upon. For this reason, Austin did not support Nkomo's return to the Lancaster House talks. He felt that:

If the funds [from the Americans] were so considerable...it was essential that the promises be made officially and formally... Later [Nkomo] returned and informed the [legal] team that the promises of funds had been repeated and emphasised, but that there would be no written undertaking and no amendment of Section 16. The team repeated its advice that Section 16 was a fundamental bar to compulsory taking, and that the promises of funding would not be worth the paper they would not be written on.

All accounts agree that the support promised by the Americans to the Patriotic Front at Lancaster House was not codified, nor were specific sums discussed.

The British government also maintains that any discussions they had with the Patriotic Front about funds for land development were vague. Explicit sums were not discussed, much less agreed upon. According to Lord Carrington, “the point was that we didn’t go into great detail, nor do I think we could have. And what’s more, if we did, we might have undone all the things that we had managed to cobble together... The Lancaster House conference couldn’t bear to go any deeper.”²⁰

Moreover, for the British government to discuss commitments in detail, the Treasury would have to get involved, which Lord Carrington seemed unwilling to do: “No sum was mentioned because nobody would think that the Treasury would like to have committed themselves quite so firmly to a sum of money.”²¹

Assurances that the Americans as well as the British were willing to be involved in a future development fund was enough to get the Patriotic Front to return to the table. Certainly this view is supported by Austin, who counselled Nkomo against taking the deal but saw that “there was no doubt that [Ambassador] Brewster’s promises, more importantly, promises known to have been authorised by President Carter, weighed heavily with Joshua Nkomo despite the legal cautions.”²²

In their evidence to the Africa APPG the government of Zimbabwe says very little about the events that occurred at Lancaster House. In its entirety, the government of Zimbabwe’s submission writes this about the Lancaster House negotiations:

The land question featured prominently during the pre-independence negotiations held in Geneva, Malta and, most importantly, at Lancaster House in London 1979. The Liberation Movements, led by the Patriotic Front, categorically made it clear that they did not have resources to buy the land required for resettlement from the white settlers. Neither did they think it historically and morally correct to tax the colonially deprived and impoverished Zimbabwean in order to raise such resources since the land was never bought from them in the first place. They stressed that the British government, as the former colonial power, was morally and legally bound to pay compensation to white settler farmers for the land that was to be acquired for resettlement.

*The Lancaster House constitutional talks almost came to a premature end because of the differences over the land issue. The talks, which were deadlocked for almost three weeks, only resumed when the British and American governments promised to support the new Zimbabwe government’s effort to mobilise the requisite resources to purchase land from white commercial farmers for resettlement purposes. This paved the way towards Zimbabwe’s independence on 18 April 1980.*²³

At no point in their evidence does the government of Zimbabwe suggest or state that at Lancaster House explicit promises or assurances on land were made by the British or the Americans. The Africa APPG feels that ZANU PF’s submission would have surely argued that promises were made if they had been. Given this, the Africa APPG has concluded that there is no evidence to support the claim that an agreement or settlement was reached between the Patriotic Front and the British and the Americans on the issue of land at Lancaster House.

But though the evidence received by the Africa APPG makes clear that no sums for land reform were discussed or settled upon in 1979, it does seem that expectations

were high about the level of commitment expected from the United States. Much of this expectation seems rooted in the statements President Ford's Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made during the 1970s proposing a \$1.5bn Anglo-American international development fund for Zimbabwe land reform.

The so-called 'Kissinger fund' raises many questions. According to Reginald Austin, this fund was to explicitly "buy out white farmers". Given that the US refused to agree to such a programme at or after Lancaster House, this seems unlikely. Nevertheless, its existence played a role at Lancaster House, particularly in the backroom negotiations. Gib Lanpher recalls a meeting he had with the Patriotic Front leaders during this time:

Both Mugabe and Nkomo ... raised clarifying questions. "What about money for land? What about the 'Kissinger Fund?'" I replied quite bluntly that the U.S. government would not provide any funds to buy out white farmers, and that while the so-called "Kissinger Fund" may have been a notion of the Ford Administration it was not on the table in the current administration. There was no ambiguity.²⁴

Though it was made clear at Lancaster House that the 'Kissinger Fund' was not a part of the negotiations, it is possible that the huge scale that Kissinger envisaged influenced not just the Patriotic Front's expectations, but also Britain's. When pressed during our evidence session about the sort of figure he thought the Americans would provide, Lord Carrington replied "hundreds of millions."²⁵

Concluding remarks

The Lancaster House Agreement was signed on 21st December 1979 without the Patriotic Front leaders acquiring the powers they wanted to address the chronic land ownership inequality they would inherit. What they had received was assurances from the British and American governments that funds would be committed to assist with land reform. The constitution – which could not be altered for 10 years – guaranteed the property rights of the commercial farmers. Land resettlement could only occur through the willing buyer-willing seller scheme, which Britain had pledged to support.

Of all the evidence received by the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, by far the most interesting is that from the government of Zimbabwe. Despite what President Mugabe and other ZANU PF figures have alleged and implied over recent years, at no point in their account did they state that an explicit sum of money was agreed upon and set aside at Lancaster House for land reform. Nor did their evidence touch upon the oft-repeated claim that Britain later reneged upon a specific promise made at Lancaster House on land.

Furthermore, no other evidence submitted – by British officials, American officials or ZAPU staff – makes any claim that Britain committed to a figure for land reform at Lancaster House. Given this, the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group concludes that no figure was mentioned, much less agreed upon, and that commitments made by either the British or the American government were assurances of support with no price tag attached.

That said, given previous sums mentioned by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, by assuring 'generous support' the expectations of the Patriotic Front – and

the British – were very high and there is no evidence to suggest that the United States did anything to manage these expectations.

Furthermore, though the Lancaster House Agreement was light in detail by necessity, it seems clear that the British government treated the land issue as a means to an end, rather than an end in itself. The prime objective of Lancaster House was to achieve a political settlement and in order to this it was necessary to defuse the land issue rather than solve it. There was no final agreement on land reform at Lancaster House. Given this, it is unsurprising that land remains a thorn in both Britain and Zimbabwe's side 30 years later.

Chapter Two:

The Impact of Land Reform

In addition to looking at the Lancaster House conference the Africa APPG's inquiry sought to determine exactly what development assistance for land reform has been provided to Zimbabwe since 1980, what impact that assistance has had, and what the main factors were which led to the decline in agricultural production and the continued under-utilisation of the land that we see today.

In examining the success and failures of land reform since 1980, context is crucial. Far from operating in a political vacuum, the resettlement programme was hugely dependent on both the domestic politics of Zimbabwe and the bilateral relationship it had with Britain. In more ways than one, 1997 was a pivotal year with the election of Tony Blair and the Labour Party in Britain coinciding with rising tensions in Zimbabwe, fueled by the so-called 'war veterans'. For ease, this section is divided between into two sub chapters, pre- and post-1997.

2.1: 1980 - 1996

Situation in 1980

At independence Zimbabwe had a land tenure system characterised by a dual race-based system divided between (largely white) commercial farms and (black) communal areas, a legacy of colonial rule. The inequalities between these two sectors was stark: while the average size of a commercial farm was over 1,000 hectares, the average size of a communal farm was 10 hectares.²⁶ Moreover, communal farm residents did not hold title to the land, and thus could not use it as collateral for bank loans in order to purchase seeds or equipment, putting them at an even greater disadvantage and perpetuating poverty in these areas.

The Zimbabwean government had two stated objectives, firstly to correct the historical and racial imbalance of land ownership and secondly to alleviate the chronic poverty and overcrowding of the communal areas. Upon being elected prime minister in 1980 Robert Mugabe began to tackle the dualist land system by merging the Ministry of Native Agriculture into the Ministry of Agriculture. However, he kept the Ministry of Land, which oversaw the Land Resettlement Programme, separate. Aware that the agricultural sector needed expertise and institutional memory, and possibly as an act of good faith, Prime Minister Mugabe appointed the former President of the Commercial Farmers Union, Denis Norman, as Minister of Agriculture.

Speaking to the Africa APPG, The Hon. Denis Norman recalls that the Ministry of Agriculture's emphasis was on the better use of communal land areas and the development of the small scale farming sector.²⁷ As it was under the portfolio of another Ministry, Norman did not oversee the Land Resettlement Programme, but as a member of the Cabinet he was involved – albeit on the periphery - in its progress. He felt that it was overshadowed in importance by other pressing issues, such as education, and did not feature highly on Prime Minister Mugabe's agenda.²⁸

Though it may not have been a priority, a Land Resettlement Programme was established, with Britain as the key donor. The land was acquired along the ‘willing buyer-willing seller’ terms agreed at Lancaster House on a 50/50 basis, with the Zimbabwean government putting up half of the amount needed. Frequently the Zimbabwean government did not have the funds, so they were supplemented by the British government.²⁹

Other international institutions contributed to land resettlement costs but not to land purchase. The African Development Bank loaned government of Zimbabwe \$27 million, the Kuwait government provided a loan/grant of £7.8 million and the European Economic Community \$6.3 million - but Britain was the only donor to contribute funds to acquire the land needed for the resettlement scheme to work.³⁰

Putting a figure on British assistance for land reform has proved problematic. According to the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID), since 1980 Britain has provided a total of £47 million for land reform: £20 million as a specific Land Resettlement Grant and £27 million in the form of budgetary support to help meet the Zimbabwe government’s own contribution to the programme.³¹ The government of Zimbabwe puts the U.K. contribution at the lower figure of £36.5 million.³²

The discrepancy between the two figures is due to differing calculations of what budget support counted as part of the land reform ‘package’ from the U.K. to Zimbabwe. However both the British and Zimbabwean governments are in agreement that £3-£3.5 million pledged has not been disbursed.³³

Aside from the U.K. contribution in the early 1980s the international response to the issue of Zimbabwe’s land reform was moderate. ZIMCORD, a donor conference held in Salisbury in March 1981, raised only £17 million in development assistance. It was, according to Lord Renwick, a “feeble response”³⁴ and a reflection of the insecurity the donor community felt about the long term success of the Lancaster House Agreement.

Nevertheless, in his evidence to the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, Zimbabwean land expert Sam Moyo concludes that the “wider development assistance (initiated through the ZIMCORD in 1981/1982) can be said to have indirectly contributed to the overall capacity (especially institutional and financial) to implement what can be considered a large resettlement programme, even if this was below the expectations of the landless.”³⁵

Box 3: Source of land resettled 1980 – 1998	
Source	Area (Hectares)
Large Scale Commercial Sector	2 937 215
Former State Land	551 770
Donations and Derelict Land	9 459
TOTAL	3 489 444

³⁶

The Land Resettlement Programme

Between 1980 and 1998 the Land Resettlement Programme bought 3.5 million hectares of land and resettled 71,000 families.³⁷ [see box 3]. These early beneficiaries overwhelmingly came from the overcrowded communal areas.³⁸ By international standards, this was a large resettlement programme that possibly did not receive the credit it deserved. One of the few to recognise the scheme's achievements, in 1989 *The Economist* labelled the Land Resettlement Programme 'one of the most successful aid schemes in Africa.'³⁹

In addition to the government's resettlement scheme, there was also transfer of land on the open market. While the majority of resettlement scheme land came from under-utilised farms, under the conditions of the constitution the government had the option of first refusal of any commercial farmers wishing to sell their property. If the government declined to buy the farm, the seller had to obtain a certificate of 'no interest' [see box 4]. Through tracing these certificates Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Member of Parliament Eddie Cross has calculated that 80% of the land seized after 2000 had been purchased post-independence,⁴⁰ indicating a vibrant property market.

The expectation for the Land Resettlement Programme was high, and ultimately proved to be unrealistic. The programme's achievements fell far short of the Zimbabwean government's target to resettle 162,000 families.⁴¹ In their evidence to the AAPPG the government of Zimbabwe blames constitutional restrictions and inadequate resources for the short fall.⁴² However, it does not explain how the target of 162,000 was reached – according to Peter Freeman, the first British development agency representative to Zimbabwe in 1980, the target “suddenly appeared” and was “many times higher than the capacity of the programme that British and Zimbabwean Ministers had signed up to.”⁴³

Zimbabwe is a geographically varied country divided into 5 Natural Regions based on rainfall [see boxes 5 and 6]. Regions I and II receive the most rainfall and are most suited to specialised (region I) and intensive (region II) farming. By contrast in regions III, IV and V rainfall is erratic and unreliable, making dry land cultivation a risky venture, with an average success rate of one good harvest in every four to five years.⁴⁴

Box 4 – A Certificate of No Interest

“During the 1980's the government brought in a piece of legislation that if you as a white commercial farmer wanted to sell your land, you firstly had to offer it to the government and they had 15 days in which to respond. The normal response would be you can't sell it [to anyone except the government] or they gave you a letter of no interest which meant you could go and sell it where you liked.”

The Hon. Denis Norman, former Minister for Agriculture

At Independence virtually all of the farms in regions I and II were owned by white commercial farmers, while the majority of the communal lands were in regions III, IV and V. [for map, see box 6]

Though there was a relatively impressive transfer of land during the early 1980s, it is important to note that the land transferred was mostly marginal and less utilised. This approach had a low impact on the commercial farming sector.⁴⁵ In their joint evidence to the Africa APPG, the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), Southern African Commercial Farmers Alliance (SACFA) and the Justice for Agriculture concurred, arguing that “much of the land bought [by the Land Resettlement Programme during the early years] had been abandoned during the bush war leading to Independence, so the impact on commercial farm output was fairly minimal.”⁴⁶

By 1985 the Land Resettlement Programme had slowed down considerably – only 14% of the total land targeted for resettlement was acquired between 1986 – 1990.⁴⁷ This was partly due to the lack of follow-through in the programme. Resettled farmers were not given deeds to their new land, nor were they provided with enough assistance to cultivate their farms. In the evidence session with the Africa APPG, former Minister for Agriculture Denis Norman explained that the reason the resettled farmers were denied title was for fear that they would re-sell their land on the open market if they had it, adding that he felt that this was not justified.⁴⁸

Overall, Norman described a fairly superficial approach to land resettlement: “there was never a follow up to acquisition of land. Acquisition is easy. The utilisation of land is a difficult thing and that was something that was fudged.”⁴⁹

Box 5 - Natural Regions I - V			
Natural Region	Area (km²)	% of total	Rainfall Characteristics
I	7 000	2	More than 1 050 mm rainfall per year with some rain in all months.
II	58 600	15	700 - 1 050 mm rainfall per year confined to summer.
III	72 900	18	500 - 700 mm rainfall per year. Infrequent heavy rainfall. Subject to seasonal droughts.
IV	147 800	38	450 - 600 mm rainfall per year. Subject to frequent seasonal droughts.
V	104 400	27	Normally less than 500 mm rainfall per year, very erratic and unreliable. Northern Lowveld may have more rain but topography and soils are poorer.
TOTAL	390 700	100	

50

claimed. They received no response.⁵⁵ With no impetus from either side and despite £3 million left unspent, the Land Refsettlement Programme became dormant and has remained so ever since. Britain has not provided any funds for land acquirement since 1990.⁵⁶

In 1990 the ‘sunset clause’ of the constitution restricting land acquisition expired. The government of Zimbabwe launched a new national land policy that July, announcing that 5 million hectares of commercial farmland was to be acquired at fixed prices.⁵⁷ The Land Acquisition Act of 1992 replaced the ‘willing buyer-willing seller’ principle and allowed for compulsory purchases. Despite this legislation, very little land changed hands and the land that did was beginning to go to senior politicians, government officials and top police and military officers, rather than to overcrowded communal farmers.⁵⁸

As the 1996 Presidential election approached, the issue of land reform gained prominence in Zimbabwe. Overseas Development Minister Lynda Chalker was unexpectedly visited by the Zimbabwean Ministers for Land and for Local Government who had arrived in London in order to discuss implementing a second phase of the Land Resettlement Programme.⁵⁹ After 3 days of meetings a memorandum was signed pledging a renewed effort on land reform.

A second mission from ODA was then despatched to look at the land reform issue. Again, it was broadly positive, though it did highlight that the cost of implementing a second phase of resettlement had risen fairly dramatically – estimated at Z\$60,000 per family (roughly equivalent to £3,600 in 1996) as opposed to the first phase, which had worked out at Z\$22,000 at 1996 prices⁶⁰. The mission understood the U.K. and possibly one or two other donors would consider meeting the cost of the land purchase. However the report concluded that the cost of administering and running the project would fall to Zimbabwe.⁶¹

The government of Zimbabwe was slow to respond to the ODA report. Having targeted the land issue in recent elections, it is possible that President Mugabe was expecting a larger commitment from the U.K. Co-author of the report, John Cusworth, believes that “expectations may have been raised beyond what might reasonably have been achieved.”⁶²

Despite the renewed dialogue between Britain and Zimbabwe during 1996, the results had been negligible. What the U.K. government may not have appreciated was the extent to which pressure on the land issue had built in Zimbabwe, and how much of this dissatisfaction was directed toward President Mugabe, who many ordinary Zimbabweans felt had fulfilled his promises on land. What few, if any, could have predicted, was the effect a Labour government was going to have on the President.

2.2: 1997 – Present Day

1997 - 2000

The election of Tony Blair and the Labour Party into government in May 1997 coincided with a deterioration of political stability in Zimbabwe.

President Mugabe had not been close to earlier Labour governments, and his coming to power in 1981 had meant that he had not had a Labour counter part during his time as prime minister and then President of Zimbabwe. As Denis Norman saw it:

His dislike of Tony Blair was an inherited one. He didn't like Harold Wilson. Because he felt that Harold Wilson delivered absolutely nothing. He carried that obsession with him into the government of Callaghan, who he didn't like. When Tony Blair came into office...he suddenly kicked off this dislike – he said 'I'm a socialist but I don't like the Labour Party'.⁶³

Norman's analysis of the situation is supported by the government of Zimbabwe's own submission to the Africa APPG, which goes to some lengths to highlight firstly that: "the Labour government has been roundly criticised over its 'imperial amnesia'"⁶⁴ and that British policy towards Zimbabwe shifted after Labour took power: "the country which publicly undertook to mobilise international assistance towards Zimbabwe's Land Reform Programme [became] the same country which is leading an international hate-campaign against Zimbabwe and its Land Reform Programme."⁶⁵

The uneasy relationship between Zimbabwe and the Labour government was further damaged in October 1997 when Tony Blair refused to provide substantial sums for land acquisition, citing previous concerns over transparency and the beneficiaries not being the poor or those most in need of land. In response, President Mugabe ordered his Ministers to draw up a list of 1,500 commercial farms covering four million hectares for rapid acquisition.⁶⁶ He made it clear he expected Britain to pay:

We are going to take the land and we are not going to pay for the soil. This is our set policy. Our land was never bought and there is no way we could buy back the land. However, if Britain wants compensation, they should give us money and we will pass it on to their children."⁶⁷

President Mugabe's suspicious attitude towards the Labour Party was further fuelled by a letter sent by Clare Short, the Secretary of State in the newly-formed Department for International Development, in November 1997. Well meaning, but misguided, her allusion to her Irish, i.e. colonised, roots infuriated President Mugabe and confirmed his prejudices about the Labour party. [see box 7]

Despite the cooling of relations between U.K. and Zimbabwe following the May 1997 election, the Africa APPG does not believe that New Labour's policies towards land reform in Zimbabwe were substantively different from the outgoing Conservative government's. In government they remained committed to the 'willing buyer-willing seller' principle and shared the previous government's concerns over the transparency of the land reform programme and the beneficiaries of land resettlement. They were unwilling to commit further funds until these concerns had been addressed.

However, the change of government in the U.K. had coincided with an increase in domestic pressure in Zimbabwe which was focused on the President. The land issue, always a political time bomb, was increasingly becoming the focus of dissatisfied Zimbabweans. President Mugabe deflected criticism on to his long term political 'foe', the Labour Party.

Box 7: Extract from Clare Short's letter

'I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new government from diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial interests. My own origins are Irish and as you know we were colonised and not colonisers.'

Concerned at these developments, UNDP held a donor conference on land in Harare in 1998. The Conference agreed to a two-year Inception Phase, during which Zimbabwe's government resettlement schemes would be tried alongside ideas from the private sector and civil society⁶⁸, and to the establishment of a UNDP Technical Support Unit⁶⁹ once Zimbabwe could show that the resettlement scheme was adhering to the donor principles of transparency, rule of law etc. However, by 1999 the government of Zimbabwe had done little to address the donors' ongoing concerns and land resettlement once again stalled.⁷⁰

The government of Zimbabwe's submission to the Africa APPG states that at the 1998 Conference the donors did not take heed of President Mugabe's warning of the "growing impatience of black Zimbabweans" on the issue of land, and that the "British government's reluctance to join the other donors was evident."⁷¹ The testimony of Denis Norman suggests that this warning was valid: President Mugabe did not have time for the measures agreed upon at the 1998 UNDP conference, he was already dealing with the highly demanding 'war veterans'.

The War Veterans Association had hitherto been a relatively benign organisation. On 11th August 1997 at the national Heroes Day celebrations however, its members began to heckle President Mugabe about pensions. Under the leadership of Dr. Chenjerai "Hitler" Hunzvi they had started to demand more of President Mugabe's spoils. According to Norman, the President received a visit from the war veterans. They demanded to see him alone, and President Mugabe agreed, dismissing the three Ministers in the room.⁷² A few hours later, President Mugabe had agreed to give the war vets a pension of Z\$2,000 for life and a lump sum of Z\$50,000.⁷³ Before long, the war vets returned demanding more, and President Mugabe agreed to a pension of Z\$4,000 a month.⁷⁴ On their third visit they demanded land. According to Denis Norman:

*It's like dealing with a blackmailer. You pay once and they come back, you pay again and on the third visit they'd really got him by this stage – I think – so it was a fairly rapid progression from the initial request for money, doubling the money and then 'lets have the land.'*⁷⁵

The extent to which war veterans had backed the President into a corner was not fully recognised by the international community, or if it was, little was done to relieve the pressure on President Mugabe. According to a former DFID land tenure specialist: "The war veterans had Mugabe cornered, politically...My view is that there was a failure of intelligence in grasping the pressure that Mugabe was under from the war veterans."⁷⁶

The culmination of Zimbabwe's perfect storm began in February 2000 with the referendum proposing changes to the constitution which allowed, among other things, the government to acquire farms without paying compensation.⁷⁷ Unexpectedly, the referendum was defeated, a first for ZANU PF since 1980 and a political triumph for the opposition party the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

President Mugabe took the defeat as a personal rejection. The party machine acted swiftly ahead of the general election that June putting a radical land reform policy at the heart of the re-election campaign. The list of 1,600 farms to be acquired grew to over 3,000, while thousands of ZANU PF sponsored settlers began to occupy commercial farms.⁷⁸ Despite losing the referendum on this issue, the government pressed ahead with their plans and altered the constitution to legitimise the land seizures and, according to their testimony to the AAPPG, "absolve it of any responsibility to pay compensation for land acquired"⁷⁹.

In response the then-U.K. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook met with President Mugabe in Cairo IN April 2000 to discuss the situation, and later a team was sent from Zimbabwe to London to re-open the land reform issue. At these meetings the British government reiterated that funds for land reform would be made available if conditions on transparency and respect for rule of law were met. The government of Zimbabwe felt that Britain's "stringent conditionalities" [*sic*] rendered the programme "totally unacceptable".⁸⁰

In the absence of an agreement with the government on land, the U.K. Department for International Development established a £5 million Land Resettlement Challenge Fund in March 2000, in order to support private sector and civil society-led resettlement initiatives.⁸¹ This, according to one Zimbabwe-based land expert, "was an absolute non-starter and a serious rebuff to the Zimbabwe government."⁸² The Zimbabwe government blocked any attempt at private sector initiatives, and the programme has been unable to proceed.⁸³

In September 2001 a conference was held in Abuja for the Foreign Ministers of the Commonwealth. Once again Zimbabwe renewed pledges to ensure that land reform was implemented in a fair, just and sustainable manner. In turn, the British government declared itself "willing to support a land reform programme that is carried out in accordance with the principles agreed by donors and the Zimbabwean government at the Harare conference in 1998."⁸⁴

Despite the pledges made at Abuja a month later the government of Zimbabwe amended the Land Acquisition Act to allow it to allocate land without giving owners the right to contest seizures⁸⁵. This directly contradicted what had been agreed at Abuja, and badly damaged Zimbabwe's reputation internationally.

The effects of Fast Track Land Reform Programme

The Fast Track Reform Programme (FTLRP) has two models of resettlement: Model A1, in which each household would be allocated at least 3 hectares of arable land but with shared grazing, and model A2, which were small, medium and large scale commercial farms with 99-year leases.⁸⁶

Box 8: Agricultural Outputs 2001 - 2007 compared to 1990's average ('000 tonnes)

Crop	1990's Ave	2001/2	2004/5	2005/6	2006/7	2007/8
Main foods						
Maize	1,684	499 (-70.4)*	915 (-45.6)	1,485 (-11.8)	953 (-43.4)	647 (-63.5)
Wheat	248	20 (-92.2)	229 (-7.8)	242 (-2.6)	147 (-40.8)	75 (-69.8)
Edible dry beans	44	50 (13)	21 (-52)	30 (-32)	30 (-32)	30 (-32)
Groundnuts (shelled)	86	120 (40)	58 (-32)	83 (-3)	125 (46)	132 (52.9)
Cereals	2,121	767 (-64)	1,162 (-45)	1,849 (-13)	1,251 (-41)	
Small grains**	167	89 (-46)	66 (-60)	164 (-1)	120 (-27)	93.1 (-44.3)
Oil seeds						
Soy beans	98	83 (-15)	60 (-39)	71 (-28)	112 (14)	48.3 (-50.7)
Sunflower	43	8 (-82)	7 (-83)	17 (-61)	26 (-40)	5.4 (-87.4)
Key export						
Tobacco	198	178 (-10.0)	83 (-58.0)	44 (-77.6)	79 (-60.2)	70 (-64.6)
Cotton	201	200 (-0.1)	196 (-2.1)	208 (3.7)	235 (17.2)	226 (12.4)
Estate crops***						
Sugar	3,113	4,200 (34.9)	3,290 (5.7)	3,600 (15.6)	3,600 (15.6)	-
Tea	15	22 (43.6)	22 (44.9)	22 (43.6)	22 (45.6)	-
coffee	9	8 (-13.2)	4 (-53.4)	5 (-51.5)	5 (-50.4)	-
Other crops						-
Citrus	90	125 (39.9)	130 (44.6)	123 (36.9)	123 (37.0)	-
Vegetables & Melons	149	162 (8.7)	181 (21.5)	161 (8.5)	162 (8.7)	-

*- percentage 2000-2008 vs. 1990's average; **- Sorghum and millet; ***Includes crops produced on individual farms and estates for direct consumption and industrial use

Source: compiled by AIAS, **Includes crops produced on individual farms and estates for direct consumption and industrial use; some proportions are thus for direct consumption

The effect of the FTLRP on agricultural production, and in particular commercial agriculture (model A2), has been devastating. 4000 large scale commercial farmers, 80 per cent of whom had bought their farms after independence in 1980 with certificates of no interest issued by the Ministry of Agriculture, have been invaded and their owners forced off the land.⁸⁷

Agricultural production crashed as a result. According to Sam Moyo, since 2000 overall agricultural production in volume terms had declined by about 50% by 2008 [see box 8], and by closer to 60% in foreign exchange or general value terms.⁸⁸

The commercial farming sector has been hardest hit by the FTLRP as land seizures has led to chronic under-utilisation of large scale farms. Commodities predominantly produced by commercial farms - wheat, tobacco, soya beans, sunflower, etc. – have been drastically affected, with declines of over 65% recorded for key export/cash crops like tobacco and oilseed. However tea and sugar plantations remain at 85% and 69% of their 1998 levels respectively.⁸⁹ Commercial (marketed) dairy and beef production and livestock have declined by over 50%.⁹⁰ [see box 9]

The effect of the FTLRP on smallholder production – model A1 under the FTLRP - has been more complex. A recent study by Professor Ian Scoones has illustrated that in some areas – Masvingo Province, for example - smallholder farmers have done reasonably well. Moreover, his research indicates that lower-valued farm areas have not been subject to the same level as political patronage. A survey conducted in Masvingo concluded that 60% of the new smallholder settlers were classified as ‘ordinary farmers’.⁹¹

Small scale commercial farms – model A2 - have been less successful as the economic meltdown has led to a lack of capital investment.⁹² According to Scoones’ research, these farms are also more likely to be rewards or compensation, in Masvingo 14% of recent small scale commercial farmers were classed as civil servants.⁹³ However, he adds “with non existent salaries from their government jobs, access to land became critical for sustaining livelihoods.”⁹⁴

Other factors in addition to the Fast Track Land Reform Programme have contributed to Zimbabwe’s decline in agricultural production. The drought experienced in 2002/2003 led to a significant slump in the production of maize and other cereals. On average cereal production levels in the 2000’s were between 30% and 65% of national requirements, depending on whether it was a drought year.⁹⁵

Fixed pricing has also had an impact. In July 2001 maize, maize products, wheat and wheat products were declared controlled products. This meant it was illegal to sell these products within Zimbabwe other than to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). Over the next few years increasingly stringent restrictions came into force. By September 2006 state control had led to severe price distortions: the government bought maize at a cost of Z\$33,000 per tonne but sold it through the GMB at Z\$6,000 per tonne, representing a 98% subsidy.⁹⁶

Box 9: Decline of Commercial Agricultural Production

Category	Crop	Commercial Production Tonnes (0 000)		Percent of 1998 levels %
		1998	2007	
Food crops	Maize			
	Wheat	521	160	31
	Soyabeans			
Export and Plantation	Cotton	77	0	0
	Tobacco	219	65	31
	Coffee	10	1	10
	Tea	18	15	83
	Sugar	553	384	69
Livestock	Dairy	184	86	47
	Beef	350	120	34
Total		2,306	957	42

97

The steep decline in agricultural output has led to a food supply deficit that has in turn led to increased dependence on food imports. This, in turn, has exposed Zimbabwe to increasing world food prices, further perpetuating food insecurity in the country.⁹⁸

The major consequence of the FTLRP has been the loss of farming skills. In addition to the management and agricultural skills of white farmers - who had created commercially viable farms through generations of farming experience - but also their skilled employees. In 2000 an estimated 320,000 farm workers, representing about 25% of Zimbabwe's total work force, were employed on commercial farms. The land seizures has meant that over 200,000 farm workers and their families – an estimated 1 million people – have lost their livelihoods and their homes, as well as access to farm schools and other social amenities.⁹⁹

Concluding remarks

The Land Resettlement Programme established in 1980 enjoyed moderate success. Though it fell below the government of Zimbabwe's targets, the resettlement of 71,000 families through the programme was a great achievement. This was supported by the two reports produced by the U.K. Overseas Development Agency in 1988 and 1996, both of which were broadly positive.

Nevertheless, while the programme addressed the needs of the landless poor it did little to solve the increasingly pressing issue of overcrowding in the communal land areas. Furthermore, no policy put in place to standardise land tenure and abolish the dualist system that discriminated against communal farms, who were unable to use their farm as collateral to purchase equipment and seeds

Relations between the U.K. and Zimbabwe were more or less positive up until the mid-1990s. By this time Britain began to express concern over the transparency of the Land Resettlement Programme and who was benefiting from it. Despite moves to enter a second phase of the programme in 1996, land reform stalled.

The election of Tony Blair and the Labour Party in May 1997 was not considered a positive development by President Mugabe, who had felt let down by previous Labour prime ministers Harold Wilson and James Callaghan. A letter from the International Development Secretary Clare Short in November 1997 was interpreted by President Mugabe as an attempt by the Labour government to absolve itself of its historical responsibility to Zimbabwe, adding to the President's distrust of the new British government.

The differences in approach to the land issue were also fundamental. The Labour government saw the issue as one of development and aid. It's "pro-poor" development policies meant aid could only be spent on helping poor people. The Zimbabwe government recognised that aspect but also saw land reform as a compensation issue, rectifying a historic injustice by returning the land to its original owners. It interpreted Britain's attempt to control how the money was spent and who the farms went to as a continuation of that colonial attitude.

The change of government in Britain coincided with rising pressure from within Zimbabwe, particularly from the war veterans. Led by Dr. Chenjerai "Hitler" Hunzvi their increasing demands on President Mugabe culminated with a claim for land. Backed into a corner and facing a chilly reception from Westminster, President Mugabe acquiesced.

Despite losing the referendum on the issue – a personal blow for President Mugabe - the subsequent land seizures were formalised in 2000 as the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. To the outrage of Britain and the international community, large commercial farms were seized – often violently - without compensation.

The economic and agricultural cost of the FTLRP has been severe. Without experts to tend to the land large scale commercial farms quickly became under-utilised leading to a catastrophic decrease in agricultural output. Not only did this dramatically affect Zimbabwe's exports, but led to food insecurity within the country. While smallholder farms (A1) have enjoyed some success, small commercial farms (A2) have suffered from a lack of inputs and have done little to alleviate the food shortage.

Chapter Three:

Recommendations for Recovery

The final aim of the Africa APPG's inquiry is to look at the medium to long term future and determine what donor funded land reform and agricultural policies implemented by the government of Zimbabwe would be most effective to increase food self sufficiency, reduce rural poverty, re-establish a vibrant agricultural sector and ensure long term political stability in Zimbabwe

Much has been written on this topic and our recommendations do not differ greatly from the conclusions of the Land Tenure Commission chaired by Rukuni (Zimbabwe, 1994) and UNDP's 2008 Comprehensive Economic Recovery report.

Land reform in Zimbabwe will be neither cheap nor straightforward, and Britain must proceed cautiously. Its colonial history in Africa, and in Zimbabwe in particular, leaves it vulnerable to emotive tirades from Zimbabwean politicians who wish to raise suspicions about Britain's motives and intentions. This is not to say that Britain should not be involved – in fact, it is imperative that Britain continues to recognise its historical obligation and support development in Zimbabwe – but its role in land reform policy must be a supportive and shared one. Working alongside other donors, Britain must work with Zimbabweans and not assume it can dictate policy.

This chapter is divided into two sub-chapters, the first looking at the overall objectives of future land reform policy and the second looking specifically at what Britain's role should be in any future land resettlement programmes. Given the wide ranging ideas that different stakeholders have on this issue, we have also included the recommendations we received from the British government, the Zimbabwean government and the Commercial Farmers' Union.

3.1: Land Reform Goals

Broadly, the objectives of any land reform policy must seek to do the following:

- Address the political as well as the economic tensions at the heart of the land issue in Zimbabwe
- End the dual land tenure system and ensure that there is a uniform land tenure system
- Establish institutions to consult with the stakeholders, administrate land policy and implement transparent, fair and sustainable land reform and resettlement within the rule of law
- Establish and pay fair compensation for land acquisition and losses
- Increase agricultural production to its full potential and address the ongoing under-utilisation of land

Box 10: British government's statement on future land reform policy¹⁰⁰

“The U.K. government stands ready to play its role in an international effort to reverse Zimbabwe's economic decline...Our support can only be effective when we see an administration in place that is committed to:

- * Full and equal access to humanitarian assistance
- * Macroeconomic reform and stabilisation
- * Restoration of the rule of law
- * The democratic process
- * Respect for internationally accepted standards of human rights

Support to rural livelihoods and the agricultural sector would be a key element of any recovery package but would require a government committed to reform and – in particular – fundamental changes and improvements in the macro-economic framework.”

Address the political as well as the economic tensions surrounding land in Zimbabwe

While land is both an economic and a development issue, it is also a political one and any medium to long term strategy must recognise this. At the end of the last millennium nearly one third of Zimbabwe's land remained in the hands of 4,600 individuals and farms.¹⁰¹ If the chronic land inequality that has characterised Zimbabwe both before and after independence is not address it will continue to undermine the country's stability.

The Africa APPG cannot condone the methods of the FTLRP, and nor can we ignore the catastrophic consequences, but we must recognise that redistributing the land in Zimbabwe is a political necessity. The aim of any future land reform policy cannot be to return to the situation of 1999 but rather to reshape Zimbabwe's land distribution in a truly equitable, fair and transparent way. The current situation is an opportunity to correct an historical wrong and address the political tensions surrounding land and to end the inequality, poverty and deprivation that characterises so many Zimbabwean lives.

To this end, the Africa APPG believes that a full dialogue must be maintained between the Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in order to focus and address the political complexities of the land issue.

End the dual land tenure system and ensure that everyone has access to fair land tenure.

Zimbabwe must move toward a single uniform land tenure system for both economic and political reasons. Economically, the security of land tenure or agricultural

property rights has been correctly identified as a critical factor which influences investment in agricultural production under the current transitional tenure regime.¹⁰²

In his oral evidence session with the Africa APPG Denis Norman pinpointed the lack of title as a crucial barrier in Zimbabwe's development: "The communal farmers still don't have individual title and I think that's holding the country back. It's time that was revised."¹⁰³

There are two options. Either everyone should have access to title or all the land should be acquired by the government and be offered out to rent.

Box 11: Land Reform Recommendations from the Hon. Denis Norman

"I think the case could be made out for the government to own all land. In other words government should acquire the land - at a proper economic price - and then they should put everything in place, resettlement schemes and offer it out to rent, to whoever wants to come forward.

'If that were adopted it takes the one crucial issue out of it – the government now owns the land. Now how are you going to utilise it? Because ownership is not the important issue, utilisation is.'

In our evidence session Norman cautiously supported the latter as a possible solution as it would mean that the focus was taken away from ownership and placed on the utilisation of the land: "[government ownership] takes the one crucial issue out of it – the government now owns the land. Now how are you going to utilise it?"¹⁰⁴

Such a system is in place in Mozambique and Tanzania where the government leases the land to the citizens but retains ownership. Norman argues that such a system in Zimbabwe would focus the agricultural sector on utilisation rather than ownership, and could be the most important factor in restoring Zimbabwe's agriculture sector and economy. [see box 11]

Ultimately it is up to the people of Zimbabwe to decide on government ownership or private ownership. Whichever they decide, what is critical is that there is only one system and everyone is treated equally within it based upon their skill.

Establish institutions to consult with the stakeholders, administrate land policy and implement transparent, fair and sustainable land reform and resettlement with respect to the rule of law

In 1994 the Rukuni Commission recommended that an independent Land Commission which would report frequently to the Zimbabwean Parliament should be established under a comprehensive Land Act. This proposal has gained broad consensus.

The function of the Land Commission will be to:

- Carry out an audit of farms settled under the FTLRP and establish the physical and legal status of landholdings
- Build a consensus on land policy
- Plan and coordinate the implementation of policy, and develop a legal and institutional framework to support the registration of land
- Oversee the transfer of land to meet the redistributive needs of the programme
- Establish a land tax to encourage the full utilisation of land and raise government revenues
- Work towards integrating the different land tenure systems into a single legal and regulatory framework

The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group supports the formation of a Land Commission. We also support the formation of the Land Fund, as suggested by UNDP in 2002.¹⁰⁵ The Fund should be accountable to the Zimbabwean Parliament for expenditure, to donors for their funding and to international financial institutions for their investments, and that it should be annually audited to ensure accountability and transparency.

Alongside the Land Commission judicial institutions must be strengthened in order to give farmers – or potential farmers – the right to appeal any decisions made by the Land Commission. The Rukuni Commission suggested that disputes between farmers and the government should be settled through an independent administrative land court. We agree.

The Africa APPG further believes that the Land Commission and Land Fund must be supported by an international multilateral effort and not proceed on a bilateral basis. As Lord Carrington stated 30 years ago, the issue of land in Zimbabwe is simply too big for one donor. The World Bank should be asked to take the lead, and the U.K. should be a generous donor.

Pay compensation for land acquisition and losses

Most recent reports on Zimbabwe, including UNDP's 2002 report, stress the need to compensate farmers for land seized during the FTLRP.¹⁰⁶ The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group believes that donors should contribute to land reform and rural development in Zimbabwe but as aid is intended primarily to relieve poverty, we do not accept that it would be a good use of government aid to pay millions of dollars to former commercial farmers.

Recent estimates suggest that compensating Zimbabwean commercial farmers could come to as much as US\$8 billion.¹⁰⁷ Given Zimbabwe's current financial crisis it will not be able to meet these costs. The expense is also beyond the means of the donor community. Current global annual expenditure on overseas development assistance (ODA) is around \$137 billion.¹⁰⁸ The \$8 billion needed to compensate Zimbabwean farmers therefore represents just over 5.5% of annual ODA. It would clearly be wrong to spend such a large percentage of global aid on compensation in Zimbabwe, especially since almost all of those who would receive the aid are not classified as poor by global standards.

In their 2008 economic recovery plan UNDP states that it is “incumbent on the Land Commission to devise innovative ways of dealing with the issue of compensation” and suggests offering unoccupied farms to commercial farmers in lieu of compensation or allocating a portion of the savings realised through debt relief to pay some compensation.¹⁰⁹

The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group is concerned that a) these policies do not address the fundamental issue of land ownership inequality and b) it is prioritising the commercial farmers loss and suffering over the loss and suffering of many Zimbabweans who, though not large scale land owners, have also lost their livelihoods and security and are amongst the poorest in the world.

The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group believes that Zimbabwean policy makers and land experts should be supported and encouraged to devise training schemes whereby commercial farmers are rewarded for passing on their knowledge and management skills to black Zimbabweans, who could then be supported through the Land Fund to apply for large commercial farms. Through such a scheme commercial farmers would receive some compensation whilst also ensuring that their skills are passed onto to the next generation of Zimbabwean farmers.

Increase agricultural production to its full potential and address the ongoing under-utilisation of land

The first act of the Land Commission should be to conduct a rigorous and independent land audit to determine which farms are currently occupied, the legality of that occupation and the state of the farm buildings and equipment. The Africa APPG understands that the Commercial Farmers’ Union has done some of the ground

Box 12: Land Reform Recommendations from the government of Zimbabwe

- Encourage engagement between the governments of Zimbabwe and the U.K.
- Remove sanctions imposed against Zimbabwe
- Influence objective media coverage of Zimbabwean issues
- Encourage new socio-cultural links between Zimbabwe and the U.K.

Actions required to enhance agricultural productivity:

- Title survey of 18,000 A2 farm subdivisions to facilitate production and registration of 99-year leases
- Acquisition of modern GPS survey equipment and base stations for the Department of the Surveyor General
- Building of a robust national land information management system that links national level with provinces and districts
- Formulation and implementation of a participatory
- land policy

work on this issue, but in the interest of transparency and accountability a land audit will need to verify their findings.

In order to maximise the potential of the land the Land Commission must select farmers who can make the most productive use of the land through a fair and transparent process. However, the Africa APPG believes that training must be provided for Zimbabweans who wish to improve their farm management skills so that they too can benefit from the land redistribution. Once settled it is imperative that the new farmers have access to equipment and seasonal inputs.– seed, fuel and fertiliser etc.

Zimbabwe should make every effort to utilise the expertise of the displaced commercial farmers who do not wish to continue farming. Enticements should be provided to encourage these farmers to enter into a mentoring scheme to share their experience and expertise with new farmers.

3.2: Britain's role in future land reform programmes

Once there is political stability in Zimbabwe Britain should seek to reengage with the Zimbabwean government on the issue of land reform with caution and humility.

The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group maintains that while Britain has an obligation to support the development of Zimbabwe, it does not have a responsibility to provide compensation to all displaced farmers. Now, as in 1979, a mass buy-out of white farmers is not a political reality, and if it happened it would be a gross misuse of aid.

Though Britain has a particular obligation to Zimbabwe, the U.K. government must take steps to ensure it does not become the sole donor of any programme. By being the only donor to provide funds for land purchases in the 1980s, Britain put itself in an impossible position and suffered the consequences: it became vulnerable to President Mugabe's politically motivated attacks. The U.K. government recognised at Lancaster House that it did not have the capacity to implement land reform single-handedly, but found itself doing just that, despite Lord Carrington's warning. Britain should take all steps to prevent this from happening again and, while accepting a larger obligation than other donors based on our shared history with Zimbabwe, we must ensure that all future support is provided on a multilateral basis.

Concluding remarks

There are several studies and reports on Zimbabwe's recovery and the role land reform will play in it. Rukuni's 1994 Commission, UNDP's 2008 'Comprehensive Economic Recovery in Zimbabwe' report in 2008 and the International Crisis Group's 2004 report 'Blood and Soil: Land, politics and prevention in Zimbabwe and South Africa' have all contributed to the debate surrounding Zimbabwe's recovery and illustrate the level of international support available to Zimbabwe once political stability returns. The Africa APPG's conclusions broadly concur with these reports.

Box 13: Land Reform Recommendations from the Commercial Farmers' Union

- A process of constitutional reform in terms of which property rights and human rights are entrenched...including a 'Truth and Justice Commission' to promote healing
- De-politicise the administration of agricultural land...[and]... establish an independent Land Commission whose mandate is to:
 - Consult all stakeholders and provide recommendations of land reform and agricultural land tenure policies
 - Formally adopt as a basic principle in land allocation that there should be no discrimination on the basis of race, gender, social class, political affiliation, religion and any other factor that might distinguish one group from another
 - Ensure strong property rights are afforded to beneficiaries of land reform
 - Conduct a comprehensive land audit
 - Manage a transparent land distribution system with beneficiary selection based on fair criteria, including the level of agricultural skills and training
 - Rectify all anomalies in land allocation that occurred during the Fast Track Land Reform Programme
 - Operate a pool of available land that can be accessed by persons wishing to acquire land
- Allow all farmers with requisite farming experience who were displaced during FTLRP who wish to return to farming to do so
- Set up arbitration mechanisms to deal with land related disputes
- In the longer term, manage the transition to a uniform land tenure system for all rural land in Zimbabwe
- Establish a compensation fund which attracts financial support from both internal and external sources to pay adequate and fair compensation for losses during the FTLRP
- Establish a resettlement fund to assist peasant farmers to be relocated when this is required
- Implement tenant farmer schemes to train beneficiaries of land reform

An independent Land Commission must be established, accountable to Zimbabwe's Houses of Parliament. The first act of the Commission will be to carry out a land audit. Once this has taken place then stakeholders and donors must meet to decide the next steps.

In conjunction with the establishment of a Land Commission an independent administrative land court must be established to manage disputes between farmers and the government in a fair and transparent way.

Zimbabwe must move toward a single uniform land tenure system if it is to tackle the chronic inequality in the country. The role of the international community must be to

support and encourage Zimbabwean stakeholders, civil society organisations and land experts to decide themselves between government acquisition or private ownership of land.

It is imperative that the recovery programme is lead by Zimbabwean stakeholders and that several donors provide assistance. By being the only donor to provide funds for land purchases during the 1980s Britain opened itself up to unfair and politically motivated criticism and ultimately became the scapegoat for President Mugabe's failing governance. Britain must be very careful not to repeat this and to ensure that all future support is provided on a multilateral basis.

Annex A:

Call for Written Evidence

You are invited to submit written evidence to the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group's 5th inquiry on the issue of land reform in Zimbabwe.

The invitation to submit written evidence is open to all but we would particularly welcome evidence from government and academic experts in land reform, land rights and Anglo-Zimbabwe relations.

The power-sharing agreement between the Zimbabwean political parties reached in September 2008 includes a request for external assistance with land reform. The aim of the report is to make policy proposals to the Department for International Development and other donor agencies which are developing plans for providing development assistance to Zimbabwe once the country's government has improved to the point that it is possible for donors to work with the government.

Amongst other things, the aid for Zimbabwe provided by DFID and multilateral donors, like the World Bank, should include assistance with land reform.

The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group report will seek to establish:

- a) what proposals were made and what commitments were given by U.K. and Zimbabwean representatives at the Lancaster House talks in 1979
- b) what development assistance for land reform has been provided to Zimbabwe since independence
- c) what land reform policies funded by donors and implemented by the government of Zimbabwe would be most effective at increasing food self sufficiency and reducing rural poverty in Zimbabwe today.

Annex B:

Written Evidence Received

The Africa APPG received written submissions of evidence from:

- 1) British Government (DFID & FCO)
- 2) Government of Zimbabwe (ZANU PF)
- 3) Martin Adams, land policy adviser, Mokoro Ltd.
- 4) Reginald Austin, former PF ZAPU legal adviser at Lancaster House
- 5) E.A. Brett - LSE specialist on crisis and reconstruction in Africa, especially in 6) Uganda, Zimbabwe and South Africa
- 6) Joint submission from Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), Southern African Commercial Farmers Alliance (SACFA) and Justice for Agriculture (JAG)
- 7) Admos Chimhowu, Zimbabwean National, University of Manchester, School of Environment and Development
- 8) Lionel Cliffe, Emeritus Professor of Politics, Leeds University. Consultant for the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation since 1970s.
- 9) Eddie Cross, Policy Coordinator General, MDC (Tsvangirai), former chief economist of the Agricultural Marketing Authority in Zimbabwe 1976-1979
- 10) John Cusworth *A Review of the U.K. ODA Evaluation of the Land Resettlement Programme in 1988 and the Land Appraisal Mission of 1996* (December 2000)
- 11) Peter Freeman *The British Role in Land Reform* (October 2007)
- 12) Beacon Mbiba, Programme Leader, Planning in Developing and Transition Economics, Oxford Brookes University
- 13) Sam Moyo, Associate Professor of Development Studies and an independent Land Policy Analyst. Former director of the Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies of the Sapes Trust based in Harare.
- 14) Robin Palmer, Global Land Rights Policy Specialist, former consultant for on lands rights issues for DFID and EU
- 15) Julian Quan, Natural Resources Institute University of Greenwich, former land tenure/policy adviser, DfID 1998 – 2003
- 16) Clare Short MP, former Secretary of State for International Development 1997 – 2003
- 17) Ian Scoones *A New Start for Zimbabwe* (September 2008)
- 18) Bill H. Kinsey *Survival or Growth? An Assessment of the Impact of a Generation of Land Redistribution on Food Security and Livelihoods in Zimbabwe* (October 2008)

Annex C:

Oral Evidence Sessions

The Africa APPG held four oral evidence sessions between May-June 2009.

Session 1:

Date: 13th May 2009

Witness: The Rt. Hon Lord Carrington of Upton, former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Session 2:

Date: 2nd June 2009

Witness: Lord Renwick of Clifton, former Head of the Rhodesia Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Session 3:

Date: 2nd June 2009

Witnesses: Beverly Warmington, Director, West and Southern Africa Division, Department for International Development, with Chris Mugatroyd (DFID); Rob Schuter (DIFD); and Fiona Robertson (FCO).

Session 4:

Date: 9th June 2009

Witness: The Hon. Denis Norman, former Zimbabwean Minister for Agriculture.

The following Parliamentarians took part in the oral evidence sessions and steering committee meetings:

Rt. Hon Baroness Amos
Richard Benyon MP
Rt. Hon Lord Freeman
Duke of Montrose
Mark Pritchard MP
Rt. Hon Lord Steel of Aikwood

Hugh Bayley MP
Lord Chidgey
Sally Keeble MP
Chris Mullin MP
Earl of Sandwich
Sir Nicholas Winterton MP

Annex D:

About the Africa APPG

The Africa APPG was established in January 2003. Its purpose is to raise the profile of African and pan-African issues at Westminster.

The current officers of the Group:

President:	Lord Hughes
Vice-Presidents:	Lord Avebury Baroness Chalker of Wallasey
Chair:	Hugh Bayley MP
Vice-Chairs:	Lord Chidgey Baroness D'Souza Lord Lea of Crondall Mark Pritchard MP
Treasurer:	Lord Freeman
Secretary:	Sally Keeble MP

The Group also has an executive committee comprised of officers of the Group and a further 20 members. Total membership of the Group is 170, including members from both Houses of Parliament. The administration costs of the Group are covered by the Royal African Society (www.royalafricansociety.org)

Previous inquiries by the Group:

Averting Catastrophe: AIDS in 21st Century Africa (2004)

The UK Government and Africa in 2005: How joined up is Whitehall? (2005)

The Other Side of the Coin: The U.K. and Corruption in Africa (2006)

Strengthening Parliaments in Africa: Improving Support (2008)

The Africa APPG can be contacted via:

G11 Norman Shaw South
House of Commons
London
SW1A 0AA
U.K.

Tel: +44 (0) 207 219 2485
Fax: +44 (0) 207 219 0346
Email: odonoghuea@parliament.uk

References

-
- ¹ Shridath ‘Sonny’ Ramphal, interview “Sleight of hand at Lancaster House in Gugulethu Moyo and Mark Ashurst (eds.) in *Day After Mugabe* (Africa Research Institute, 2007) p. 160.
 - ² Sam Moyo, written evidence to the Africa APPG
 - ³ BBC, 18.04.08
 - ⁴ DFID, written evidence to the AAPP
 - ⁵ International Crisis Group “Blood and Soil: Land, Politics and Conflict Prevention in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa” 2004. p. ix.
 - ⁶ South Africa rejoined the Commonwealth in 1994
 - ⁷ Lord Renwick, oral evidence to the AAPP, 02.06.09
 - ⁸ Peter Freeman “The British role in land reform” *The Zimbabwean*, 31.10.07
 - ⁹ Professor Reginald Austin, written evidence to the AAPP
 - ¹⁰ Lord Carrington, oral evidence to the AAPP. 13.05.09
 - ¹¹ *ibid.*
 - ¹² Email from Gib Lanpher to Richard Dowden, 03.07.09
 - ¹³ US Ambassador to the U.K. 1977-1981. Died in 1988
 - ¹⁴ Lord Carrington, oral evidence to the AAPP, 13.05.09
 - ¹⁵ *ibid.*
 - ¹⁶ Lord Renwick, oral evidence to the AAPP, 02.06.09
 - ¹⁷ Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. In office 1977 – 1980. Died 2002.
 - ¹⁸ Email from Gib Lanpher to Richard Dowden, 02.07.09
 - ¹⁹ Austin, evidence to the AAPP
 - ²⁰ Lord Carrington, oral evidence to the AAPP, 13.05.09
 - ²¹ *ibid.*
 - ²² Austin, written evidence to the AAPP
 - ²³ Government of Zimbabwe, written evidence to the AAPP
 - ²⁴ Email from Gib Lanpher to Richard Dowden, 03.07.09
 - ²⁵ Lord Carrington, oral evidence to the AAPP. 13.05.09
 - ²⁶ UNDP, Comprehensive Economic Recovery in Zimbabwe, 2008. p. 149.
 - ²⁷ Denis Norman, oral evidence to the AAPP 09.06.09
 - ²⁸ *ibid.*
 - ²⁹ DFID, written evidence to the AAPP
 - ³⁰ Sam Moyo, written evidence to the AAPP
 - ³¹ DFID, written evidence to the AAPP
 - ³² Government of Zimbabwe, written evidence to the AAPP
 - ³³ DFID evidence, p. 2. GoZ evidence, p. 9.
 - ³⁴ Lord Renwick, oral evidence to the AAPP
 - ³⁵ Sam Moyo, written evidence to the AAPP
 - ³⁶ Government of Zimbabwe written evidence to the AAPP
 - ³⁷ *ibid.*
 - ³⁸ Bill Kinsey, written evidence to the AAPP
 - ³⁹ “Land Hungry” *The Economist* 28 October 1989.
 - ⁴⁰ Eddie Cross, written evidence to the AAPP
 - ⁴¹ Government of Zimbabwe, written evidence to the AAPP
 - ⁴² *ibid.*
 - ⁴³ Peter Freeman “The British role in land reform” *The Zimbabwean*, 31.10.07
 - ⁴⁴ Food and Agriculture Organisation, Corporate Document Repository *Socio Economic Impact of Smallholder Irrigation Development in Zimbabwe 2000*
 - ⁴⁵ Sam Moyo, written evidence to the AAPP
 - ⁴⁶ Commercial Farmers’ Union, Southern African Commercial Farmers Alliance and the Justice for Agriculture Trust, supported by the Compensation Coalition, Agric Africa and the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association, written evidence to the AAPP. From here on in to be referred to jointly as Commercial Farmers’ Union.
 - ⁴⁷ UNDP – Comprehensive Economic Recovery in Zimbabwe, 2008. p. 152.
 - ⁴⁸ Denis Norman, oral evidence to the AAPP, 09.07.09
 - ⁴⁹ *ibid.*

-
- ⁵⁰ FAO Corporate Document Repository *Socio Economic Impact of Smallholder Irrigation Development in Zimbabwe* 2000 p. 428
- ⁵¹ Taken from archive of Proceedings of the National Academy of Science <http://www.pnas.org/content/102/35/12623/F1.large.jpg> Published online August 22, 2005.
- ⁵² Professor John Cusworth “A Review of the U.K. ODA Evaluation of the Land Resettlement Programme in 1988 and the Land Appraisal Mission of 1996” in .A.S. Bowyer-Bower and Colin Stoneman (eds), *Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Constraints and Prospects* (Ashgate, 2000) p. 26.
- ⁵³ ODA Evaluation of Land Resettlement Programme, 1988. p. 2.
- ⁵⁴ *ibid.* pp. 28-9.
- ⁵⁵ DFID, written evidence to AAPP
- ⁵⁶ Martin Adams, written evidence to the AAPP
- ⁵⁷ UNDP, Comprehensive Economic Recovery in Zimbabwe, 2008. p. 153.
- ⁵⁸ *ibid.* P. 153.
- ⁵⁹ Peter Freeman “The British role in land reform” *The Zimbabwean* 31st October 2007
- ⁶⁰ Cusworth “U.K. ODA Evaluation” p. 33.
- ⁶¹ *ibid.*
- ⁶² *ibid.*
- ⁶³ Denis Norman, oral evidence to the AAPP, 09.06.09
- ⁶⁴ Government of Zimbabwe, written evidence to the AAPP
- ⁶⁵ *ibid.*
- ⁶⁶ UNDP p. 153.
- ⁶⁷ The Guardian, 15th October 1997.
- ⁶⁸ DFID, written evidence to the AAPP
- ⁶⁹ UNDP, p. 154.
- ⁷⁰ *ibid.*
- ⁷¹ Government of Zimbabwe, written evidence to the AAPP
- ⁷² Denis Norman, oral evidence to the AAPP, 09.06.09.
- ⁷³ *ibid.*
- ⁷⁴ *ibid.*
- ⁷⁵ *ibid.*
- ⁷⁶ Julian Quan, written evidence to the AAPP
- ⁷⁷ UNDP, p. 154.
- ⁷⁸ *ibid.*
- ⁷⁹ Full quote: “The Parliament of Zimbabwe on 6 April 2000 amended the constitution of Zimbabwe to empower the Government of Zimbabwe to compulsorily acquire land for resettlement purposes and absolve it of ant responsibility to pay compensation for land acquired for this purpose.”
Government of Zimbabwe, written evidence to the AAPP
- ⁸⁰ Government of Zimbabwe, written evidence to the AAPP, 16.02.09
- ⁸¹ DFID, written evidence to the AAPP
- ⁸² Martin Adams, written evidence to the AAPP
- ⁸³ DFID, written evidence to the AAPP
- ⁸⁴ *ibid.*
- ⁸⁵ *ibid.*
- ⁸⁶ UNDP, Zimbabwe. P. 154.
- ⁸⁷ Eddie Cross, written evidence to the AAPP
- ⁸⁸ Sam Moyo, written evidence to the AAPP
- ⁸⁹ UNDP, Zimbabwe. P. 155.
- ⁹⁰ Sam Moyo, written evidence to the AAPP
- ⁹¹ Ian Scoones “A new start for Zimbabwe?” September 2008. Submitted as written evidence to the AAPP
- ⁹² *ibid.*
- ⁹³ *ibid.*
- ⁹⁴ *ibid.*
- ⁹⁵ Moyo, p. 7.
- ⁹⁶ UNDP, Pp. 154-5.
- ⁹⁷ *ibid.* p. 155.
- ⁹⁸ Moyo, p. 24.
- ⁹⁹ UNDP, p. 158.
- ¹⁰⁰ DFID, written evidence to the AAPP

¹⁰¹ Sara Berry “Debating the Land Question in Africa” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 44, 2002. p. 660.

¹⁰² Sam Moyo, p. 9.

¹⁰³ Denis Norman, oral evidence to the AAPP, 09.06.09.

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ UNDP, p. 167.

¹⁰⁶ *ibid.* p. 170.

¹⁰⁷ MDC Manifesto, 2007

¹⁰⁸ 2007 figure for total ODA disbursements is \$137,052. OECD Development Assistance Committee Database

¹⁰⁹ UNDP, p. 171.