

# Security and Africa: An Update

A collection of essays on  
developments in the field of security  
and Africa since the UK Government's 2010  
Strategic Defence and Security Review

**November 2012**



*Africa All Party  
Parliamentary Group*



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Cover photograph:  
UN Photo/Tobin Jones

A.U. Forces Hold Training Sessions for Somali National Police Women officers of the Somali national police are shown during a ceremony inaugurating their training programme, conducted by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)'s Police Training and Development Unit and funded by the Italian Government. They are among 160 officers participating in the two-week course at the General Kaahiye Police Academy in Mogadishu.

15 October 2012  
Mogadishu, Somalia  
Photo # 532202

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## **Acronyms**

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
BSO	Building Stability Overseas
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPP	Conflict Prevention Pool
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FDLR	<i>Forces Democratiques de Libération du Rwanda</i> - Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
ICC	International Criminal Court
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
CNDP	<i>Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple</i> - National Congress for the Defence of the People
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MNJ	<i>Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice</i> - Niger Movement for Justice
MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MUJAO	Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCP	National Congress Party
NTC	National Transitional Council
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PARECO	<i>Patriotes Résistants Congolais</i> - Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance
RCD	<i>Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie</i> - Congolese Rally for Democracy
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SDSR	Strategic Defence and Security Review
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan

## **About the Contributors**

### **Hugh Bayley MP**

Hugh Bayley is Labour MP for York Central. He was a Minister in the Department of Social Security between 1999-2001. He has been a member of the House of Commons International Development Select Committee since 2001 and Chair of the Africa All Party Parliamentary since the group was launched in 2003. He has extensive experience working on Africa issues, stretching back to the 1970s and 1980s, when he was a member of the Executive Committee and National Committee of the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

### **Knox Chitiyo**

Dr Knox Chitiyo is currently the Africa Fellow with the Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House). Prior to joining Chatham House in 2012, Knox was the Africa Fellow and Head of the Africa Programme at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, from 2007 to 2011. Before coming to the UK in 2005, Knox, a Zimbabwean, was Senior Lecturer in War Studies and History at the University of Zimbabwe from 1992- 2003. During this time, he also co- founded the Centre for Defence Studies at the University of Zimbabwe and was the Deputy Director of the CDS from 1995-2003. Knox has also taught on the Joint Command and Staff Course at the Staff College in Zimbabwe and at the Gweru Military Academy. He has published on Zimbabwean, Southern African and wider African defence and security issues in academic and popular media.

### **Phil Clarke**

Phil Clark is Lecturer in Comparative and International Politics, with reference to Africa. An Australian by nationality but born in Sudan, Dr Clark is a political scientist specialising in conflict and post-conflict issues in Africa, particularly questions of peace, truth, justice and reconciliation. His research addresses the history and politics of the African Great Lakes, focusing on causes of and responses to genocide and other forms of mass violence. His work also explores the theory and practice of transitional justice, with particular emphasis on community-based approaches to accountability and reconciliation and the law and politics of the International Criminal Court. Previously, he was a Research Fellow in Courts and Public Policy at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford, a Golding Research Fellow at Brasenose College, and co-founder and convenor of Oxford Transitional Justice Research.

### **Richard Dowden**

Richard Dowden is Director of the Royal African Society. He first went to Africa as a teacher in 1971, then as a journalist for *The Times* in 1983. In 1986, he became Africa Editor of the *Independent*, and in 1995 Africa Editor for the *Economist*. In addition to writing extensively about Africa, he has made three full length documentaries on Africa for Channel 4 and the BBC as well as several shorter films. He also continues to write on African issues and appears frequently as a commentator on African affairs on the BBC, CNN, Sky News and other broadcast media. His book: *Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles* was published in the UK September 2008 and in America in 2009.

### **Sally Healy OBE**

Ms. Sally Healy OBE is a Fellow of the Rift Valley Institute and a specialist in the politics of the Horn and Eastern Africa with broad interest in regional security, conflict analysis, political development, governance and elections. She led the work on the Horn of Africa at Chatham House from 2007 to 2011 and has produced influential reports on the diplomatic and economic dimensions of conflict in the region. She used to work as an analyst in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office covering politics and development issues in Eastern Africa. She served overseas on postings to the British Embassy Addis Ababa (1987-90) and the British High Commission Nairobi (1995-8).

### **George Joffé**

George Joffé is a Research Fellow at the Centre of International Studies at the University of Cambridge, and Visiting Professor of Geography at Kings College, London University. He specialises in the Middle East and North Africa and is currently engaged in a project studying connections between migrant communities and trans/national violence in Europe. He is also a lecturer on the Centre's M.Phil. in International Relations. Between 1997 and 2000 he was Deputy Director and Director of Studies at Chatham House.

### **General Sir David Richards GCB CBE DSO ADC Gen**

General Sir David Richards has commanded at every rank in the Army and on campaigns in East Timor, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, where he was the first commander to be awarded an operational knighthood since the Second World War. As Chief of the Defence Staff and professional head of the Armed Forces he is the government's military adviser and, due to his earlier successful command in Africa, has maintained close links with key individuals across the continent giving him a diplomatic role.

### **Marko Scholze**

Marko Scholze is an anthropologist working for the institute of ethnology at the Goethe University Frankfurt/Main in Germany. He has done extensive research and fieldwork on issues like tourism, development aid and cultural heritage (UNESCO) in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali. Currently he is coordinating different exchange and fellowship programs between Germany and Africa, especially West Africa, including the *Point Sud* Programme in Bamako, Mali.

### **Patrick Smith**

Patrick Smith is the Editor of Africa Confidential, a fortnightly newsletter reporting and analysing political and economic developments in Africa (established 1960). His previous roles include: Founding Editor, with Richard Synge, of the Africa Report, a quarterly owned by Jeune Afrique Group (2005); Associate Producer of the Channel 4 documentary *My Friend the Mercenary*, on an attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea (broadcast in 2005); Technical Advisor to the UN panel on the exploitation of mineral and other resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2002-03); and expert witness to the UN Security Council on conflict in the Mano River region (Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea) in 2000.

### **Jason Stearns**

Jason Stearns is Director of the Rift Valley Institute's Usalama Project, and the former coordinator of the United Nations Group of Experts on the Congo. He has

over ten years experience of working on the Congo for organisations including the International Crisis Group, the UN Mission in the DR Congo, and the International Human Rights Law Group (now Global Rights). He is the author of *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa*.

**Dan Smith OBE**

Dan Smith has been the Secretary General of International Alert since 2003. His work on peace issues started when he began research on UK defence policies in 1976. Prior to joining Alert Dan held a number of senior positions, most notably as Director of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo from 1993 to 2001. He was Chair of the Advisory Group for the UN Peacebuilding Fund until 2011. At Alert he produced the path breaking *A Climate of Conflict* (2007) report on the links between climate change, peace and war and continues to lead the organisation's advocacy on a range of issues critical to the reduction of conflict and building of peace. He was awarded the OBE in 2002 and blogs on international politics at [www.dansmithsblog.com](http://www.dansmithsblog.com).

**Alex de Waal OBE**

Alex de Waal is the Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation and a Research Professor at Tufts University. From 2009 to 2011 he served as Senior Advisor to the African Union High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan. He was also Programme Director at the Social Science Research Council, with responsibilities for research programs on humanitarian issues and HIV/AIDS and social transformation. His academic research has focused on issues of famine, conflict and human rights in Africa. He was awarded an OBE in the UK New Year's Honours List of 2009, was on the Prospect/Foreign Policy list of 100 public intellectuals in 2008 and the Atlantic Monthly list of 27 'brave thinkers' in 2009.

**Myles A. Wickstead CBE**

Myles was appointed Visiting Professor (International Relations) at the Open University in late 2005. This followed a career in development and diplomacy which included serving on the Executive Board of the World Bank and as British Ambassador to Ethiopia. Myles was in 2004/2005 Head of Secretariat to the Commission for Africa (CfA), whose Report 'Our Common Interest' formed the basis of the Communiqué on Africa at the Gleneagles Summit.



## Foreword

When the UK Government announced that it was going to undertake a Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) in 2010, the Africa APPG felt it was important that the case was made for maintaining a strong military element within an integrated British Africa policy. As such we published a report entitled *Security and Africa* and submitted this to the SDSR. The report made five broad conclusions:- that there was a need for better coordination between the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DFID); that funding for the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) should be maintained; that the remit of defence attachés should be expanded; that the UK should continue to provide military training for Africans; and that there was a need to coordinate with international partners, specifically NATO and the EU. While some progress has been made on these issues, there remains a need for increased coordination both between the UK Government Departments, and with our international partners. Our conclusions remain valid, and I hope the UK Government will continue to pursue these avenues.

The past two years since the SDSR have seen a number of key developments related to security and Africa, most notably the Arab Spring in the north of the continent, but also across several regions of sub-Saharan Africa, and in the broader political environment. These developments have critical implications for security in Africa and elsewhere and we feel it is important that these issues, and what they mean for the UK and Europe, are considered carefully. As such, we set about compiling an update to our original report.

The update highlights specific regions where the situation has moved on, as well as a selection of thematic issues which were not expanded on in the original report. We do not discuss explicitly the issues which are examined in the APPG's previous report, in particular transnational threats such as piracy, terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking, and migration, but direct readers to our previous report for a review of these issues; the lessons are very much still valid. The essays should be considered as representing a selection of issues we see as critical and are not intended to make up an exhaustive list.

We felt a powerful way to highlight these issues was to invite a selection of the world's experts to write short essays on these subjects, which serve as an introduction to the key debates, highlighting the breadth of issues of relevance to security and Africa. These were circulated individually amongst the Members of the APPG, who were invited to provide feedback, before the essays were compiled into this collection. Each of the authors has included some of their thoughts on the implications of the issues for UK and international policy, which are aimed to provoke discussion. The views expressed are their own, and do not necessarily constitute the views of the APPG or its Members.

I am delighted that such a strong pool of experts, each amongst the leading authorities in the world on their subjects, has contributed to this report.

Of the geographical essays, Sally Healy of the Rift Valley Institute updates us on the situation in Somalia, while George Joffé of the University of Cambridge discusses the

on-going security threats resulting from Libya's Arab Spring, challenging UK policy-makers to leave their European counterparts to lead the way in this part of the world. Marko Scholtze, Coordinator of the *Point Sud* Programme in Bamako, Mali and based at Goethe-University Frankfurt/Main, discusses the differences between the situations in three countries in the Sahel: Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, emphasising how ethnic divisions and fall-out from the war in Libya have affected stability across the region. Africa Confidential editor Patrick Smith discusses the political nature of the security situation in both the north and south of Nigeria, while Jason Stearns, Director of the Rift Valley Institute's Usalama Project, considers the multi-faceted nature of the conflict in the Congo, and what this means for how we address it. Finally, myself and World Peace Foundation Executive Director Alex de Waal discuss security concerns between Sudan and South Sudan, arguing that despite a recent political breakthrough, peace-building in the region is difficult, slow, and frustrating, and requires continued British support.

Addressing the thematic issues, SOAS's Phil Clarke advocates for the need to recognise the unpredictable effects of interventions by the International Criminal Court, particularly in cases of on-going conflict or during election periods, while Chatham House's Knox Chitiyo discusses challenges and opportunities facing the African Union peacekeeping force. Richard Dowden, Director of the Royal African Society warns of the risks – and opportunities – that a growing, frustrated and well-informed youth present to the continent, while Chief of Defence Staff General Sir David Richards discusses the implications of the Strategic Defence and Security Review for UK military involvement in Africa. Dan Smith, Secretary General of International Alert, explains how climate change adds to a range of other factors in increasing the risk of instability in Africa, highlighting that win-win policy solutions can address climate change and promote peace-building at once. Finally Open University's Myles Wickstead discusses how the UK can use "soft power" to promote a more stable and secure Africa, through the policies which affect development on the Continent.

I hope this collection will serve as an introduction to those who have so far had little involvement with security issues affecting Africa, and highlight new issues and perspectives to those well acquainted with the Continent. Above all, it is intended to prompt debate about how the UK and other international actors should best respond to security issues in Africa, at this critical period in the Continent's development.

My sincere thanks go to each of the authors for sharing their expertise and perspectives with the APPG, to the Members of the Group who have sent feedback on the original essays and the Royal African Society, and its Director Richard Dowden, who provide the Secretariat for the APPG. Victoria Crawford edited the collection and Hannah Reimer provided administrative support.



Hugh Bayley MP  
Chair, Africa APPG

# **Part I: Regional Update**

## Security Concerns in Somalia

*Sally Healy OBE, Fellow of the Rift Valley Institute*

Somalia has now entered its third decade of state collapse. Although some important political changes are now afoot, there is little prospect in the short term that a centrally governed state can be restored. Externally led state building efforts over the last eight years in support of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) had very limited success. Key donors also assist local administrations in areas of stability that show development potential.

Despite recent political developments, several aspects of the Somali situation remain unchanged: the main conflict continues between Al Shabaab and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); Somaliland and Puntland remain largely stable but politically fragile; the Somali diaspora provides substantial and essential support; vulnerable communities remain in acute need of humanitarian assistance.

Somalia's problems have been exacerbated by outside powers seeking to impose their own solutions or reacting to the growth of political Islam. The militant extremist group, Al Shabaab, opposes any form of Western intervention or influence. It has controlled large areas of south central Somalia where it is battling AMISOM forces. Al Shabaab's public alignment with Al Qaeda brings it within the ambit of global terrorism, adding another layer of complexity to Somalia's politics.

### **Recent developments**

A number of recent developments have implications for the situation in Somalia.

#### **(i) A new President for Somalia**

The TFG's term of office was brought to an end in August 2012 with an interim constitution hastily put in place. While this termination came about largely at the insistence of external actors, it stirred the Somali political process into a broader dialogue that produced some unexpected and highly significant results. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected President by an (expanded) parliament in September. He is untainted by any association with the TFG and has promised a new approach to politics based on reconciliation and inclusivity. As a highly respected educator and civic leader in Mogadishu, as well as a permanent resident there, Hassan Sheikh is better equipped than any of his predecessors to make this a reality. He has already offered dialogue with Al Shabaab.

#### **(ii) Weakening of Al Shabaab**

Shabaab's decision to leave Mogadishu in August 2010 contributed to the restoration of stability in the capital. Their continuing terror attacks against Somali targets there added to their unpopularity. The failure to assist famine victims during the humanitarian crisis of 2011, compounded by their refusal to allow assistance from the West, further undermined Al Shabaab's credibility. The leadership's association with Al Qaeda has alienated Somali followers concerned with Somalia's political future rather than international jihad. Shabaab's recent abandonment of the

port of Kismayo under pressure from Kenyan AMISOM forces will deprive the organisation of its last major source of internal revenue generation.

(iii) Strengthening of AMISOM

The AMISOM forces have made slow but steady progress. The force has expanded from its core of Ugandan and Burundian troops with the addition of forces from Djibouti and the incorporation of Kenyan troops already operating inside Somali borders in support of local allies. In February 2012 troop levels were raised to 18,000 and a new funding formula was agreed by the United Nations providing a more solid financial foundation for the AMISOM operation. AMISOM has progressively reduced the territory under Al Shabaab's control in South Central Somalia culminating in the taking of Kismayo at the end of September 2012.

(iv) Growing regionalisation of the conflict

Kenya joined Ethiopia as a major player in the Somali conflict when its forces crossed the border in October 2011. Kenya's interests are impacted by refugees, pressures on its own Kenyan Somali population, and fear of radicalisation and/or terror attacks by Al Shabaab inside Kenya. Despite skepticism on the part of its neighbours, Kenyan forces have progressively made territorial gains against Al Shabaab. Their presence has also put a stop to the financial benefits that Shabaab drew from its control of important trade routes into Kenya.

(v) Worsening of the humanitarian situation in south central Somalia

In 2011 rains failed across the southern regions while the politicisation of humanitarian aid in Shabaab held areas limited the help that could be provided. Many perished and thousands fled to refugee camps in northern Kenya or to TFG held areas in Mogadishu.

(vi) New forms of international engagement in Somalia

The humanitarian crisis of 2011 drew the world's attention to Somalia's on-going conflict and its many unresolved problems. Countries such as Turkey and Qatar became more engaged in the search for solutions.

### **Potential threats**

From a narrow UK security perspective, the main security threat from Somalia lies in the risk of British Muslims (whether of Somali or other origin) being recruited for international jihad and obtaining their training from Al Shabaab inside Somalia. The reduction of operating space for Al Shabaab inside Somalia could be regarded as a success. However, a weakened Shabaab, holding less territory, could transform into a greater threat if it were to re-focus its efforts on terror attacks outside of Somalia. Thus far, there has been no repeat of Shabaab's July 2010 attack in Kampala, its first outside the country.

Shabaab's operations also pose a threat to neighbouring Ethiopia and Kenya, with significant Somali populations of their own. AMISOM's action is designed to contain

this threat. The difficult judgment is whether foreign intervention can defeat Al Shabaab or whether it serves to fuel a militant response against intruders.

### **UK policy**

The UK has adopted a cross government and long-term approach to tackling the security challenge from Somalia. The government took an international lead by convening the London conference of 23 February 2012 and strongly supporting political change to bring an end to the TFG. The UK also supports military options, including AMISOM and the efforts of neighbours as well as EU anti-piracy operations. British aid has increased to an average of £70m a year to 2015, with 40% for Somaliland.

A platform for stabilisation and the gradual restoration of governance in Somalia now exists. Its attainment would reduce the security threat in the region. It needs to be nurtured in ways that respect Somali ownership of both the problem and the solution. The UK should give principled support for Somalia to achieve a locally owned settlement and avoid the temptation to crowd the political agenda with concerns of their own or those of Somalia's neighbours.

## Security Concerns and Libya

*George Joffé, Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Studies,  
University of Cambridge*

Britain has had a long relationship with Libya, going back to the suppression of the Barbary Corsairs in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as well as the then British Consul's role in the Manshiyya Revolution that ushered in the Ottoman occupation in 1835. Its modern engagement with Libya however dates from the Second World War when, following the expulsion of Rommel's *Afrika Korps* from Tunisia, Britain took over the occupation and administration of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. At the end of the conflict, Britain played a leading role in the United Nation's acceptance of the Sanusi monarchy as the legitimate ruler of the independent state in 1951, obtaining a major airbase in the east of the country, as part of its defence posture in the Cold War.

In 1969, these arrangements were shattered by the Great September Revolution that eventually brought the Qadhafi regime to power. Soon the base was abandoned and, in 1971, British oil interests in Libya were seized. Relations worsened as the new regime became ever more radical, reaching their nadir in 1984 with the killing of a policewoman in St James's Square in London outside the Libyan Embassy and a consequent breach of diplomatic relations. The destruction of an American airliner over the Scottish town of Lockerbie and the subsequent UN sanctions placed on the regime further compounded this. It was only in April 1999 that the sanctions were suspended and not until the end of 2003 that normal relations were fully resumed. Following the outbreak of civil war in Libya in mid-February 2011 and subsequent NATO operations in defence of the civilian population, the Qadhafi regime collapsed the following October.

### **The current situation**

The nature of the war, fought by militias formed spontaneously to challenge the regime, has meant that Libya now faces an acute security problem. Despite its recognition by the international community, the National Transitional Council (NTC), formed in the wake of the outbreak of conflict in 2011, has not been able to impose itself on the militias, partly because it is a Benghazi based movement, and partly because it never controlled the Tripolitanian militias from Misurata and Zintan which actually fought the war. These militias control Tripoli itself and the towns around it and challenge the authority of the NTC. They also mete out torture, arbitrary justice and punishment to supporters of the former regime. In addition, because the Qadhafi regime had fragmented the Libyan state, no institutions exist through which the state can be rebuilt easily. In the rural hinterland security is worsening as disgruntled elements of the former regime roam and terrorise virtually unchecked.

Yet, against this depressing picture, there are also encouraging signs. Despite its problems, including threats of Cyrenaican secession, the Council has been able to persuade some of the militias to yield control of ports, border crossing-points and airports to its own nascent security forces – the rump of the Libyan army, the

Ministry of Defence's Libya Shield formed from former militiamen, and the Ministry of the Interior's Supreme Security Committee's forces. Its Executive Council (the Cabinet) has been able to organise elections for an assembly which will draft a constitution. In addition local elections have been held in Misurata and in Benghazi. The national elections in early July saw a 60 per cent turnout and resulted in a win for the nationalist coalition led by Mahmoud Jibril, the NTC's former first premier whose National Forces Alliance took 39 seats compared to the Islamist Justice and Construction Party's 17 seats. And, most importantly, the oil industry is producing at levels close to those before the civil war, although it is still in need of repair.

### **Ongoing security threats**

Yet, despite the gradual resolution of the chaos that followed the civil war, serious security threats remain. Well-armed and provisioned remnants of the old regime have retreated to Mali, Niger and Algeria from where, led by members of Colonel Qadhafi's family, they continue to threaten the new Libyan state. Retreating mercenary forces have organised a rebellion in Mali designed to create a new Touareg state in the north of the country. Some have linked with al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM), to create a new, amplified terrorist threat in the Sahel and the southern Sahara. AQIM itself is said to have re-armed itself with weapons smuggled out of the wartime chaos in Libya.

In other words, the Libyan crisis has sparked off a major crisis throughout the Sahara and the Sahel, even involving Mauritania, which finds itself the unwilling custodian of the Libyan security chief, Abdullah al-Sanusi. Algeria, seeing itself as the guardian of Saharan affairs, nonetheless excludes Morocco from the security arrangements it wishes to put into place with its ally, the United States, because of its longstanding dispute over regional hegemony and the Western Sahara.

### **UK engagement**

To what extent does this engage British interests? Insofar as Britain considers stability in the South Mediterranean crucial to its wider economic and political concerns, North Africa, the Sahara and the Sahel cannot be excluded. Investments in the region and trade with it are significant and need protection. Yet, at the same time, Britain enjoys little agency because its levels of engagement are relatively modest. Instead, it must learn to depend on its European partners – a difficult lesson to learn, no doubt!



## Security Concerns in the Western Sahel

*Dr. Marko Scholze, Coordinator, Point Sud Programme, Goethe University*

From medieval times, the Western Sahel was characterised by powerful kingdoms and empires like those of Mali, Songhay, Kanem Bornu or Mossi. Then, in the nineteenth century, the region became incorporated into the French colonial empire, serving to supply raw-material and soldiers for the First and Second World Wars. In 1960, the Republics of Mali, Niger and Obervolta, renamed Burkina Faso in 1984, gained their independence.

The colonial drawing up of the borders has strongly influenced the economic and social relations of the ethnic groups living in these regions; Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are multi-ethnic states. While in Mali and Niger over 90% of the population is Muslim, the religious situation in Burkina Faso is much more diverse, with a mixture of Islam, Christianity and indigenous religions. Mali and Burkina have succeeded in creating a national consciousness among their citizens however, whereas in Niger regionalism and ethnicity are the most important features of identity.

The Tuareg in the north of Mali and Niger hold a special position within these states. They have felt marginalised by their respective governments since independence. This has led to several rebellions by Tuareg groups in the 1960s, the 1990s and during the years 2006-2009.

### **Current Situation and Security Incidents**

The country currently facing the most alarming situation across the region is Mali. Since January 2012, a new Tuareg rebel group, the National Movement for Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), has seized several cities in the North. The MNLA is led by Tuareg who served as soldiers in the army of Libya and returned home in the end of 2011 after the fall of Gaddafi. Another group based in the North is the Al Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), whose members are mostly of Algerian and Mauritanian origin and have been responsible for several kidnappings of Europeans since 2003. Additionally, a dissident group of AQIM, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar Dine, another Islamic fundamentalist group led by the Tuareg Iyad Ag Ghaly, a leading figure in the rebellion of the 1990s, are also struggling for power in the region. Whereas the MNLA is fighting for an independent state of Azawad in the North, Ansar Dine and AQIM strive to introduce Islamic sharia law across the whole of Mali. All these movements are well armed, having pillaged military depots in Libya.

The Malian state cannot control the vast northern territory, where the illegal traffic of goods, migrants, arms and drugs abound. This unstable situation resulted in a military coup by the Colonel Sanogo against President Amadou Toumani Touré in March 2012. The rebel and fundamentalist groups in the North have taken advantage of this weakening of the state and conquered cities like Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu and Douentza.

The military junta in Bamako has since given way to a civilian transitional government, but it remains powerful. The northern territory remains controlled

especially by the fundamentalist rebel groups. The transitional government and ECOWAS have agreed on a transitional period, which ends in 2013 with the next presidential elections, as well as the conditions for the deployment of ECOWAS troops in Mali to reclaim the North.

In Niger, the situation is different. Following the military coup in 2010 against President Mamadou Tandja, democracy has been restored. A new government was elected in April 2011 with Mahamdou Issoufou as Head of State. This government has managed to integrate some of the most influential political leaders and rebels of the Tuareg such as Rhissa ag Boula, who was elected Regional Counselor of Agadez and appointed Adviser to the President. Another Tuareg, Birgi Rafini was nominated as Prime Minister. Aghali Alambo, the leader of the Movement for Niger for Justice (MNJ), served as Counselor for the President of the National Assembly Hama Amadou, before being imprisoned and charged for arms trafficking.

Another reason why Niger has not seen the rebellion that Mali has is that most of the Tuareg did not support the last uprising by the MNJ, which caused civilian casualties and brought any development in the region to a halt. The Tuareg are tired of violence and want peace. However, despite not having any bases there, the AQIM of Mali has also been active in Niger, carrying out kidnappings and organising the illegal traffic of arms through the country.

Niger and Burkina Faso were both heavily affected by migrants returning from Libya, causing serious economic and social problems in their home communities. In addition, both countries have to deal with a growing number of over 130,000 Malian refugees who are fleeing violence and the introduction of the sharia law in the North.

### **Challenges going forward**

The first priority is to establish a stable government in Mali, able to handle the conflict in the north of the country. Without this, there is a risk the separatist and religious movements consolidate their power. To reclaim the north, the Malian state needs military assistance from ECOWAS and neighbouring countries such as Mauritania and Algeria. It seems likely that ECOWAS troops will be sent to Mali soon. However, the outcome of the Malian military and foreign troops invading the north is unclear. Ansar Dine and AQIM on the one hand, and the MNLA on the other, have nothing in common regarding their goals, but they are likely to join forces to counter a Malian offensive. It also remains unclear how Ansar Dine and AQIM in particular would react to a military invasion. This could not only cause a humanitarian catastrophe with civilian casualties and refugees but could also lead to suicide bombings in Bamako and other Malian cities. Nevertheless, a solution to this conflict by means of negotiation seems to be out of reach at the moment.

### **Consequences for UK involvement**

Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso need assistance to deal with the refugees from the north, as well as aid to reintegrate the migrants returned from Libya. This assistance is all the more necessary as the Sahel faces another serious drought. There is a risk these three factors lead to a serious humanitarian and hunger crisis, which in Mali could further destabilise the already weakened state. The political support of the

transition process in Mali is another important task for the European Union and, through it, the UK.

## Security Concerns in Nigeria

*Patrick Smith, Editor, Africa Confidential*

How bad will the crisis get in Northern Nigeria? Bad enough to create a vast zone of lawlessness stretching northwards to Mali and derail any hopes for a new prosperity and stability in West Africa. That, at least, is the view of a senior African politician who wanted to speak frankly but anonymously about the growing regional security dangers.

The politician, himself a devout Muslim, pointed to an intersection of local and regional forces. The starting point, he said, was the arrival in the 1970s and 1980s of legions of Wahhabi proselytisers from Saudi Arabia and Tablighi clerics from Pakistan across the Sahelian belt. They set up in northern Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Mali, thanks to wealthy funders in Jeddah and Riyadh.

Their Islamist message – the imposition of strict sharia law across the region, sexual segregation and that western education and African states were *taagut* (evil) – clashed with the mainstream imams. The line from the Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad (known locally as Boko Haram or 'Western culture is forbidden') is that Nigeria's corrupt and apostate elite is responsible for the worsening economic and social conditions in the north.

Regional armies and security services, which were hollowed out by corruption together with IMF and World Bank-imposed budget cuts, were powerless to deal with the jihadist onslaught, said the politician, adding: “The result is the defeat of Mali's army by jihadists and the Boko Haram insurgency against the Nigerian Government.”

### **Nigeria's jihadist movement**

Now Nigeria has an organised jihadist movement, which uses digital technology and Islamist chat forums. It targets the northern Moslem establishment, the traditional emirs and the plutocratic generals as much as President Goodluck Jonathan's Christian dominated Government.

Its adherents boast ties to Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and Al Shabaab in Somalia, and it has training grounds across the region. Founder of Boko Haram Mohammed Yusuf, whose assassination by police in 2009 sparked the latest intense wave of violence, set up Koranic schools in honour of the 14<sup>th</sup> century jihadist, Ibn Taymiyyah. An intrepid researcher Hussein Solomon at Free State University in South Africa, reports that Boko Haram militants have been fighting alongside *Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest* (MUJAO) in northern Mali.

Security specialists and agents pontificate on whether Boko Haram is a co-ordinated organisation, a system of related cells, a terror franchise or even a convenient myth for nefarious local politicians. President Goodluck Jonathan's allocation of almost US\$6 billion to armed forces and intelligence services – more than a quarter of the national budget – produced little discernible improvement.

The worst attacks – a suicide bomber killing over 18 people in the UN office in Abuja and a raid on Kano killing over 200 – show considerable coordination. The relentless attacks on police, moderate imams and churches appear more random. The vast majority of victims of these attacks have been northern Moslems. But many imams are reluctant to condemn the attacks, let alone proselytise against Boko Haram

### **The response**

Others, such as Central Bank Governor Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, argue for a regional planning organisation to tackle economic deprivation – “a northern Nigeria development council.” The Bishop of Sokoto, Matthew Hassan Kukah, says the crisis should not be seen as a Christian/Moslem or North/South matter: “It is part of the larger conflicts over access to power and relations to the Nigerian state.”

Questions of justice and fairness should be central to the political argument, says Kukah. “The North has to make up its mind about the quality of education and modernisation that it would expose its young people to ... the population of the North is huge. To have this population without education is a liability.”

Under growing pressure, President Jonathan appointed a veteran intelligence officer, Colonel Sambo Dasuki, as National Security Advisor replacing General Owoye Azazi. A cousin of the Sultan of Sokoto, Colonel Dasuki has the confidence of the northern establishment and has launched back channel talks with Boko Haram affiliates.

Dasuki will struggle to make progress without sweeping reform of the corrupt and nepotistic police force, whose officers are a key target of Boko Haram attacks. Morale is at rock bottom; absenteeism rates are over 50%. Under these conditions, basic policing is difficult, let alone running forensic investigations and counter-terrorism operations.

The army's Joint Task Force takes a blunderbuss approach with its violent searches for Boko Haram suspects. JTF soldiers are drawn from national forces, often having few cultural and linguistic affinities with local people, who see themselves as under military siege.

### **Not just the north**

Security problems don't stop in the north and politically-contested middle belt. Unrest is mounting again in the oil-rich Niger Delta, where the Jonathan government agreed a costly amnesty programme. Militant groups are pursuing local political feuds and vendettas. Some of the worst clashes are between factions of the ruling People's Democratic Party.

Motives are more pecuniary than political. Offshore piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is growing, threatening ships along one of the continent's busiest routes. Small, agile gangs in speedboats board ships, raid them for oil and other cargo, then swiftly move on.

Some 400,000 barrels a day are lost to elaborate schemes of bunkering and oil theft run by militant groups and pirates, according to Royal Dutch Shell and other companies. They point to the involvement of corrupt military officers and politicians in the operations. In turn, the oil companies are accused of falsifying tax returns and bribing National Assembly Members to vote down reforming legislation.

North and South, Nigeria's security crises are really political ones: tackling the corruption and inequities that are firing up the insurgents. For now there's little sign of President Jonathan's government summoning the political will to deal with the roots of the crisis.

## Security Concerns in the Eastern DRC

*Jason Stearns, Director of the Rift Valley Institute's Usalama Project*

The conflict that began in 1996 in the Congo has percolated through different phases and incarnations, persisting until today. The causes of the violence are multi-dimensional, which has complicated the search for solutions – if the problem is located at local, national and regional levels, which is the best entry point?

### **Historical overview**

When the war first broke out in 1996, it drew on deep communal tensions simmering in the Kivus, the first strand of a triple helix of local, national and regional causes. Many of these were linked to the contested citizenship of Hutu and Tutsi populations that had immigrated during the colonial and pre-colonial periods. The Belgian administration organised up to 300,000 Rwandans to immigrate to North Kivu to provide manual labour on ranches and plantations. Tutsi pastoralists, later called Banyamulenge, arrived in South Kivu in various waves from the nineteenth century onwards, migrating to the high plateau overlooking Lake Tanganyika.

This immigration, coupled with misguided policies on land and citizenship during the reign of both the Belgians and later Mobutu Sese Seko, led to deep-rooted tensions between communities. Mobutu manipulated these cleavages to his advantage, first courting the rich Tutsi elite, and then catering to the so-called indigenous lobby by calling Hutu and Tutsi citizenship into question. The democratisation process that began in 1990 acted as a catalyst for these tensions, as politicians used ethnic divisions in order to mobilise voters. The result was a vicious cycle of communal violence in both North and South Kivu that killed thousands and formed the backdrop of the regional war that began in 1996.

This war was triggered by the Rwandan genocide, which sent up to a million refugees into the Congo, along with the perpetrators of the massacres. The new Government of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), along with the support of Ugandan, Angolan and other armies in the region, launched an invasion to break up the refugee camps and, eventually, to topple Mobutu from power. After helping bring Laurent Désiré Kabila to power, the Rwandan government fell out with its former allies and launched a new rebellion in the eastern Congo. This introduced a new dynamic of regional tensions, especially between Kinshasa and Kigali, that would provide the main impetus of the fighting since 1998.

The final strand of the triple helix is the weakness of the Congolese state apparatus, a dereliction that has developed since the colonial administration and that has become part and parcel of the strategy of governing in the Congo. The Congo does not have a tradition of a national, impartial bureaucracy, and the Belgian administration did little to develop local capacity before independence. Faced with local strongmen and rebellions, and lacking a good security apparatus, the central Government in Kinshasa resorted to patronage and divide-and-rule tactics, leading to political fragmentation rather than the creation of a strong hierarchy.

## Recent history

Which brings us to the conflict that has continued to percolate in the Kivus since 2003. Despite the peace deal that brought belligerents together in a transitional government, violence persisted in the Kivus. At the centre of this conflict is a group of former officers of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), which had been allied to Rwanda during the war. This group, led by General Laurent Nkunda, became the National Congress for the Defence of Democracy (CNDP) in 2006.

In response to Nkunda's insurrection, various other local armed groups emerged, mostly along ethnic lines. The strongest of these was probably the *Coalition des patriotes résistants* (PARECO), with its influential Hutu wing. These armed groups, along with a host of Mai-Mai groups, allied with the Congolese army in its offensive against the CNDP.

This violent confrontation, which displaced hundreds of thousands of people, came to an end in 2009, when the Congolese and Rwandan government struck a deal that led to Nkunda's arrest, the integration of the CNDP into the Congolese army and the launch of joint Rwandan-Congolese operations against the *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda* (FDLR), a Rwandan rebel group based in the Kivus.

What was the root of these new rebellions? Was it the unsolved struggles over land, Rwandan meddling or state weakness?

The CNDP, which was the first mover in this new conflict, did not emerge at the grassroots level due to land conflict, and the group has few links to customary authorities. Rather, it emerged as an elite-led response to the politics of the peace deal that reunited the country in 2003. When the RCD joined the transitional government in 2003, it stood little chance of survival. It was divided and unlikely to garner many votes in the 2006 elections. The stakes were high: Much of Goma's elite had prospered thanks to the patronage and protection of the RCD and Rwanda. To safeguard these interests, the CNDP was formed by senior members of the RCD, along with officials in Kigali and Goma.

This is not to say that land and identity do not matter. The CNDP draws on inveterate fears of discrimination within the rwandophone community of North Kivu. But the level of analysis is misplaced: it is not customary chiefs and peasants who are the group's driving constituency, but rather political and military elites.

This is not true for all groups. Some Mai-Mai groups, local militias that emerged as a response to the CNDP, have more tenuous links to elite networks, and are more rooted in the realities of rural life, with its land pressures, poverty and histories of communal violence. Moreover, these groups often have a more diffuse command structure, which means that reining them in is not so much a matter of striking a deal with one set of elites or commanders, but of providing incentives to the rank-and-file.

This account does not discard the importance of the state. It is precisely because the state is weak and riddled with patronage networks that elites feel the need to ally themselves with armed men to protect their interests.



## **Dealing with the quandaries of multi-layered problems**

So where do we start? With the disgruntled elites, the weak army or the land pressures? What are the priorities, given that these problems are all interconnected?

There is no one-fits-all solution; each group has its own dynamic and interests. But a political settlement must be reached before structural challenges can be addressed. In this vein, that the deepest rift in the region is the one between ex-RCD officials and Kinshasa. As long as this conflict remains alive, it will be difficult to convince other local militia to demobilise. Solving this rift will require high-level diplomacy and a deeper understanding of the main actors – especially elites in Kigali, Goma and Kinshasa – and their interests.

This diplomacy will have to confront deep commitment problems. The pivotal question: “How can you guarantee my interests after I integrate or demobilise my militia?” will be difficult to answer, but possible solutions include decentralisation, local power-sharing deals and increased demilitarisation of the region. Strong diplomatic pressure on Kigali and Kinshasa to refrain from supporting proxy forces in the Kivus is another crucial ingredient to short-term stability.

Further down the road, it is clear that for any durable peace, programmes will also have to target the rank-and-file, both current and potential recruits. Here, a mixture of economic incentives and increased deterrence through policing should be considered. The Congolese Government has long resisted restarting another demobilisation programme, but the failure of past ones was probably in part linked to the sequencing: you can’t demobilise militias if the war is not over.

There is also an urgent need to reform the rural economy, especially the patterns of land ownership and use, to assuage local feuds that can escalate.

Finally, the golden grail of donor intervention: the reconstruction of an accountable, efficient state. It is questionable whether this can be done from the outside, and perhaps donor intervention can even exacerbate matters. Past attempts have been thwarted by a poor understanding of local actors and the vested interests of many in maintaining a weak state. But as with demobilisation, progress in this direction is unlikely as long as there is no firm political settlement in place in the Kivus.

## **Security Concerns between Sudan and South Sudan**

*Alex de Waal, Executive Director, World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher School,  
Tufts University and advisor to the African Union on Sudan,  
and Hugh Bayley, MP for York Central*

Shortly before the people of southern Sudan voted in their historic referendum on self-determination in January 2011 that divided Sudan into two nations, delegates from the National Congress Party (NCP, ruling northern Sudan) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM, ruling southern Sudan) met and adopted a principle of "two viable states," to be good neighbours and at peace with one another. On the eve of the referendum, Sudanese President Omar al Bashir visited the southern capital Juba and promised that, although he was a lifelong unionist, he would welcome a southern vote for separation if that entailed peace. He kept his word, and stood beside the leader of the world's newest nation, President Salva Kiir, on South Sudan's Independence Day, 9 July 2011.

### **Recent developments**

However, South Sudan achieved independence facing a host of internal developmental and governance challenges, and a raft of unresolved issues from the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Over the following six months, negotiations on the pumping of oil from South Sudan through Sudan, on financial arrangements to cushion the fiscal shock to Sudan on losing half its budget and more than 80% of its hard currency, on nationals of one state resident in the territory of the other, on the finalisation of disputed areas on the common border, and on a security arrangement along that border, yielded few results. This took place against a backdrop of renewed armed conflict in two states of northern Sudan, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, where former comrades in arms of the South Sudanese, waged a new insurgency against the government in Khartoum. Accusing the north of stealing its oil, South Sudan shut down its oil production in January 2012, thereby at a stroke losing 98% of its government revenue—an act that dismayed South Sudan's friends. In February and March, clashes along the border intensified, with South Sudan supporting rebels crossing into the North and the Sudanese air force bombing sites along and across the border. It escalated to outright war on 10 April when South Sudan sent its troops into the major oil producing area of northern Sudan, Heglig, and claimed the area as its own.

On 24 April 2012, the African Union Peace and Security Council adopted a "Roadmap," consisting of seven immediate actions to defuse the conflict, followed by three months of intensive negotiations to resolve the outstanding issues between the two states. On 2 May, the UN Security Council passed resolution 2046, under Chapter VII, recognising the conflict as a threat to international peace and security, and demanding the same steps. Both governments accepted the resolution. Khartoum complained that it was the victim but was being treated on equal terms with the aggressor, and Juba was taken aback that it had lost its international standing as the perennial victim, and was facing coercive action by the UN, and a sharp loss of confidence from its erstwhile friends in Washington DC and other western capitals. The AU and UN set a three month deadline for the two parties to

resolve their differences, later extended to 22 September. President Bashir and President Kiir arrived in Addis Ababa that day for a Summit, which continued until the signing of a Cooperation Agreement and eight other agreements on 27 September.

Almost immediately after the April AU resolution, both countries withdrew their armed forces to their side of the border, and violent clashes markedly reduced. But implementation of the “Safe Demilitarised Border Zone” required by the resolution was delayed, and as a result the UN-led “Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism” protected by Ethiopian peacekeepers (who constitute the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei, UNISFA), could not be deployed. Agreement on how to activate these mechanisms was reached only in September.

The disengagement of the armies of Sudan and South Sudan and the establishment of a UN-supervised buffer zone is only the first step. Each country is supporting rebels fighting against the other. Khartoum sponsors militias in South Sudan, which have the stated aim of overthrowing the Government of South Sudan, and Juba has backed not only the northern wing of the SPLM, but also Darfur rebels who reject the internationally-sponsored Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. The two governments have agreed to a complaints procedure under their “Joint Political and Security Mechanism,” headed by the two ministers of defence, but this will only work if there is goodwill on both sides. The 27 September agreement promises that there will be an end to such rancour and distrust.

Having earlier agreed to just five disputed border areas, South Sudan increased its territorial claims in May 2012 by issuing a new map that included areas such as Heglig as South Sudanese territory. While the two governments have agreed a temporary security line, they still dispute where the final boundary lies. The AU has set up a team of experts, tasked with providing an authoritative but non-binding opinion, on the borderline in the disputed areas. The team should report in a few months.

More significantly, the two presidents failed to agree on a resolution of the contentious area of Abyei. South Sudan accepted an AU proposal for how a referendum should be held to reach a final settlement, but Sudan rejected it. The initiative now passes back to the AU Peace and Security Council, which meets on 21 October to receive a report from the High Level Panel, headed by President Thabo Mbeki, on how to proceed.

Each country faces serious internal political problems, made worse by their respective economic crises. President Bashir repudiated a Framework Agreement painstakingly negotiated between his representatives and the SPLM-North in June last year, instead seeking a military solution—and succeeding only in engendering a new war. Despite efforts at mediation by the AU Panel, that war continues, bringing humanitarian crisis in its wake. The rebels—the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North—have accepted an internationally brokered plan for humanitarian access, but Khartoum continues to stall on implementing it..

In South Sudan, the 2006 Juba Agreement, President Kiir’s greatest achievement that reconciled the disparate non-SPLA militia, threatens to unravel as the government is unable to pay army salaries and inter-ethnic grievances fester. A completely

unsustainable 40% of Juba's budget goes on its armed forces, and almost all its revenue has dried up since oil stopped flowing. International donors are still providing generous aid to South Sudan, and \$500 million to the UN peacekeeping mission UNMISS in its first year, but it should not and will not fund the former SPLA fighters who still expect to be paid by their government.

### **The way ahead**

Amid this gloomy picture, the good news is that there is international unanimity on the way ahead. The AU and UN adopted precisely the same roadmap, and the UN and the "troika" of the United States, Britain and Norway, along with regional countries such as Ethiopia, have actively supported President Mbeki and the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel. The Panel marked considerable success with the 27 September agreements, but major challenges lie in the unresolved issues (Abyei, the disputed border areas, and the conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile), and also in implementing the international commitment to monitoring the border.

The British Government is a leading partner in all the key aspects of this process, and its support to the AU Panel is a fine example of coordination between the FCO, DFID and MoD. Britain has contributed expertise to the security talks and to the border discussions, and has helped fund the mediation effort, as the leading donor to the AU Border Programme, which is providing the technical expertise to the Sudan-South Sudan border negotiations. It has also taken a lead in exploring the technical process required for relief of Sudan's international debt, a necessary precondition for the normalisation of Sudan's financial relations with western donors and the Bretton Woods Institutions. The UK contributes about £90 million a year in aid to South Sudan and £60 million a year to UNMISS. There will be additional financial demands to support UNISFA's role in supporting border monitoring. As we look ahead, the UK should continue to support humanitarian and development programmes in both countries, and take actions to ensure that both are financially viable. It should seek a basis for North South agreement on oil revenues and press for reduced defence expenditure in both Khartoum and Juba.

Notwithstanding the breakthrough in September, this will remain a difficult, slow and frustrating process, but there is no alternative.

## **Part II: Emerging Thematic Issues**

## The International Criminal Court and Security in Africa

*Dr. Phil Clark, Lecturer in Comparative and International Politics, SOAS, University of London*

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is now an established actor in responding to mass conflict and serious human rights violations in Africa. Since the Court's inception ten years ago, all of its investigations and prosecutions have centred on African suspects. This approach has generated considerable controversy and accusations that the ICC represents neo-colonialist meddling in African affairs, but it also reflects the extent of violent conflict and insecurity on the continent that warrants the Court's attention.

Because of the ICC's mandate, which allows it to investigate only crimes committed after 2002, the Court regularly operates in volatile situations of ongoing conflict. This raises important questions over the Court's ability to maintain the security of its own personnel and local witnesses during investigations but also the Court's impact on the broader security of the countries under investigation. There are two main realms that require consideration in this regard: the ICC's effect on situations where violence is continuing; and its impact on countries facing heavily contested national and other elections.

### **Peace vs. Justice**

First, the common 'peace versus justice' debate among scholars and practitioners centres on whether international judicial actors such as the ICC exacerbate rather than diminish conflict by removing incentives for high-level suspects to lay down their arms and engage in peace negotiations. This was a constant argument during the peace talks between the Ugandan government and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in 2006-2008, during which some critics viewed the ICC's indictment of Joseph Kony and other LRA leaders as an impediment to their participation in the talks.

Beyond the specific context of peace negotiations, there are more general concerns about the ICC's impact on situations of ongoing violence. These are encapsulated by the recent escalation in conflict in North Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In May 2012, the Congolese warlord and ICC indictee, Bosco Ntaganda, led an armed mutiny of former rebels who had been integrated into the Congolese army. The mutiny triggered violent clashes between the former rebels and the army and the forced displacement of tens of thousands of civilians into other parts of eastern DRC and the neighbouring countries, Rwanda and Uganda. Ntaganda cited his indictment by the ICC – and Congolese President Joseph Kabila's recent threat to hand him over to the Court – as the principal reason for the insurrection. Undoubtedly there are other dynamics behind Ntaganda's rebellion, not least the complex geopolitics of central Africa, including Rwanda's historical use of Ntaganda to pursue its own national interests in Congo. However, the Ntaganda case highlights the difficult interplay between the ICC and security and the challenges of predicting how ICC interventions will shape the behaviour of rebel leaders and other armed actors.

While advocates of the ICC such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International paint the Court as a key tool for bringing peace to countries like the DRC, on the ground realities are significantly more complex. Supporters of international justice argue that the investigation and prosecution of high-level suspects can help remove them from the conflict zone and sanction their military and financial backers, thus contributing to overall peace. The Ntaganda example, however, underscores that the threat of international prosecution can also force high-level combatants to escalate conflict in order to insulate themselves from prosecution. Similar dynamics may be at play in the situation of the LRA, which sees no alternative to its continued campaign of violence through swaths of central Africa, given the threat of ICC indictment coupled with the joint Ugandan-United States military operations against the rebels. Serious questions remain therefore over whether, in the long term, the ICC contributes to peace and security or encourages combatants to continue fighting.

### **The ICC and Elections**

Second, when considering the security implications of the ICC's work in Africa, we should also examine the impact of ICC interventions in countries experiencing volatile election campaigns. Nearly all of the African countries where the ICC has operated to date have held such elections, which in several cases have involved ICC indictees as presidential or other candidates. In such situations, the ICC stirs tensions because its indictments affect the legitimacy and ability to campaign of candidates who may have substantial domestic popular support. During the Sudanese presidential elections in 2010, political opponents used the ICC's indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir as a means to discredit him. Meanwhile, Bashir himself used the ICC indictment as a rallying cry, claiming that the Court represented further evidence of an international conspiracy to unseat him. In the case of the DRC, the presidential election in 2011 was transformed by the absence of Jean-Pierre Bemba, who had narrowly lost to Kabila in 2006 and was subsequently arrested and transferred to The Hague for prosecution. Bemba's many supporters viewed the 2011 vote as hollow, given Bemba's inability to run, and accused Kabila of using the ICC as a means to sideline popular political opponents.

These issues are likely to come to a head during the Kenyan presidential elections which have been delayed to 2013. Two presidential candidates, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, have been indicted by the ICC and have already appeared in preliminary hearings in The Hague. There is a distinct possibility that their trial will coincide with the elections, around which there are already significant tensions following the post-election violence in Kenya in late 2007 and early 2008. This scenario highlights that the ICC's targeting of popular political figures during combustible electoral periods may constitute a source of instability.

### **International Support**

In the context of ongoing conflict and volatile elections in Africa, the role of UK and other foreign policymakers should be to recognise the often unpredictable effects of ICC interventions and, wherever possible, to identify ways to minimise any negative consequences. This may involve using leverage with the ICC to acknowledge complex political realities on the ground and to tailor its public pronouncements and the timing of indictments and prosecutions with those firmly in mind. As a legal institution, the ICC often seeks to insulate itself from these political dynamics, in the

name of judicial neutrality and impartiality. However, the UK and other major backers of the Court can use their influence to make the Court fully aware of the political ramifications of its interventions in complex conflict situations in Africa.



## 21st Century Peace Operations in Africa: Africanising Peace

*Dr Knox Chitiyo, Africa Fellow, Chatham House*

Peacekeeping in Africa has been on the global radar for decades. Since the 1960s, peacekeeping in Africa has traditionally been seen as the international (read: western) community's burden. More often than not, analyses of peacekeeping are tinged by an Afro-pessimism which focuses more on the failures of peacekeeping than on the successes. A relatively recent example is the 2007 Economist article on African peacekeeping; although it commended the successful peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the overall tone is of lamentation. The Africa Union-United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is described as a "lame duck" and African Union (AU) Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is described as "forlorn". An important sub-text - common to many assessments of the time - is that peacekeeping in Africa is primarily the responsibility of the international rather than the African community; the implication being that Africa is unwilling or unable to take responsibility for its own peace operations.

How times have changed; fast forward five years and AMISOM is now seen as a successful, perhaps even transformative peace operation which has played a pivotal role in ushering in a "new Somalia", breaking free from the fetters of failed statehood. The past half decade has seen an operational and psychological shift in African peacekeeping from International Peacekeeping in Africa, to African peace operations with international support. The AMISOM operation has shown that Africa is willing to take greater responsibility for its peace operations, and has the competency to do so.

### **Continuities and Changes**

There has not been a revolution in African peace keeping, but there is an ongoing transformative evolution. Some of the constants and continuities remain; bilateral and regional-multinational forces will remain, the bedrock of peace operations in Africa for the foreseeable future. For instance, ECOWAS/ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States / Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) and UN forces still play a major role in West Africa, and UNAMID, originally an AU force, remains in Darfur. The traditional frameworks of cooperation remain.

The AMISOM operation, although stylistically similar in some ways to previous African peace operations, is ringing the changes on African peace operations. The 2007 AMISOM intervention in Somalia, although badged as an AU force, was essentially a bi-national operation involving the armies of Uganda and Burundi. After four years of maintaining a defensive in Mogadishu and Baidoa, AMISOM was able to finally take the offensive against al Shabaab in August 2011. The Kenyan and Ethiopian invasions of Somalia in October that year put even more pressure on the insurgents. By the time of the London conference on Somalia in February 2012, al Shabaab, riven by internal feuding and popular disaffection, had lost the strategic initiative and was in retreat on multiple fronts.

There is a "first glance" similarity between AMISOM and previous ECOMOG operations; both are multinational operations in which external forces partner with local forces for peace operations. But whereas ECOMOG interventions are often dominated by Nigerian forces, the post 2011 AMISOM intervention has not had a dominant force. Instead, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia and local Somali forces have had to evolve and adapt to the AMISOM mission, resources and operational structures. At one level, AMISOM is undoubtedly a regional force writ large. At another, it has become a global template for African led peace operations.

Somalia and previous African interventions in Darfur, Burundi and the Central African Republic show that while resources are important, the future of African peace keeping is not about throwing more money at peacekeepers; it lies in having a clear, achievable mission statement, competent militaries, good military and political leadership, and a willingness to operate within financial constraints. Funding peace will always remain contested terrain but African peacekeepers have demonstrated they can achieve results on minimal budgets. Given the continued global financial strictures, it is likely that Africa remains a template for austerity peace operations.

### **Challenges and Opportunities**

There can be no gainsaying that African peace operations still face considerable challenges, including: limited capacity in ground transport, very limited airlift capacity (South Africa apart, African forces remain highly reliant on international air capacity), limited funding, the need to integrate multinational command and operations, and challenges in logistics, and in developing civilian capacity for peace-building. In addition, the number of AU peacekeeping operations across Africa is likely to grow, with the Sahel-Sahara region insecure and, east Africa facing various ethno-nationalist discontents. In addition, Africa policing remains chronically under-resourced and besieged by the challenges of Africa's urban growth.

But the African tradition is one of resilience and turning challenges into opportunities and this also applies in the sphere of peace operations. Africa's strength is that at all levels peace operations have always been seen in holistic terms as a process. Over the past decade, Africa has strengthened its tool box of levers - mediation (e.g. the Panel of the Wise), military and political diplomacy, economic and diplomatic sanctions, civilian inputs, and robust peace operations - to make for more effective conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building. Most importantly, the political will to prevent or end conflict has increased, as demonstrated by the responses of the regional communities of ECOWAS, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), to political-military crises in their respective regions. In addition, there has also been an important psychological shift; traditionally AU or regional forces engaged in peace operations with the expectation that they would be shortly re-hatted as UN forces with access to UN resources. With UN global peacekeeping now facing financial and operational constraints and with African peacekeepers demonstrating that they can indeed hold the line, there is now less of a "rush to re-hat".

### **Future Thinking**

At a strategic level, the real challenge for African peace operations is whether and

how to integrate national, bilateral, regional, continental and multinational forces into the African Peace and Security Architecture. Should multinational African forces be under a single command or do they work better as essentially national forces under a multinational rubric? What is the "sweet spot" between resources, capacities and priorities? How best can political diplomacy complement military diplomacy? And, in an era of fiscal austerity, can UN forces be re-hatted as African forces, rather than vice-versa? There are no simple answers but what is clear is that we must re-think African peace operations, to bring it all together and join the dots. What is needed is an African equivalent of the 2000 UN Brahimi Report on UN Peacekeeping, or an equivalent of the Prodi Report, i.e. a report which outlines the past, present and likely futures of African peace operations.

### **The UK and African Peace Operations**

Africa is trying to become less dependent on economic and security aid, but this takes time and the West (particularly the EU) will remain a partner in Africa's development for the foreseeable future (although the terms of reference and the power relationship may change). The UK assists in global and African peace support operations, as a member of the G8 and the EU. Indeed, the bulk of UK support to AU missions is provided multilaterally through the EU, as part of the EU- AU framework. The UK's military footprint in Africa is small (less than one hundred trainers/observers across the continent); it should resist the temptation to use a large development and military footprint as an indicator of global standing.

In Somalia, the UK and global community can play an important role in assisting AMISOM and Somali forces with training and logistical support, as well as in helping to mediate the different international security and development agenda. The UK can also help to ensure that the global promises of funding for Somalia are honoured, and play an important role in ensuring that the new African security thinking focuses on Policing in Africa, rather overlooked by AMISOM's "military dividend".

For all the talk of the AU learning from NATO, the UK can help demonstrate that NATO and future EU battle groups can actually learn much about cost-effective peace operations from African forces. While the UK's tradition of hosting world militaries at military colleges such as Cranfield and Sandhurst should continue, where possible the UK should support local and international training institutes in Africa either financially, by posting trainers, or through online learning portals.

### **Conclusion**

Peace operations in Africa are very much a work in progress; there are still enormous challenges including the question of whether, institutionally, the AU can offer sustained support and vision to its peacekeepers. But what has become clear over the past decade, most tellingly demonstrated by AMISOM, is that Africans can and are doing the job; and for the most part are doing it well, perhaps better even than UN and other international forces on the Continent. Africa will continue to need support, but there is a real sense that Africa is setting its own peace operations and the global community will follow Africa's lead rather than dictate to it. Hopefully, when The Economist writes a follow up piece on African peacekeeping, it will contain less of the apocalyptic tones of the "gloomy science".

## The Coming Tsunami in Africa - People

*Richard Dowden, Director, Royal African Society*

In 1950 the population of Africa was estimated at 180 million. Today it is one billion. By 2050 this could double to two billion. While the United States' fertility rate is estimated at 2.06 and Europe's at 1.59, in sub-Saharan Africa each woman has on average 5.07 children. There has never been such a dramatic demographic change in such a short space of time. It will change Africa in extraordinary ways that we cannot predict. For Jean Michel Severino, former head of the French Government aid agency, this is "the most incredible demographic adventure that human history has ever known. A time neither for rejoicing nor for fear, but simply for recognising the facts... Africa's demographic advance over the next fifty years is unstoppable. The worst thing to do would be to ignore it."

This population explosion will mean an increasing proportion of Africans will be young. On current predictions there will be 600 million Africans under the age of 25 by 2020 and 800 million by 2050. And they will be heading to the towns from rural areas. By 2030 most Africans will live in towns. Are African cities, often badly planned or unplanned, ready to absorb these vast new numbers? In 1950 no African city had more than a million inhabitants. Now 38 cities have more than a million and half of those have several million. But what levels of education and skills will they bring? Africa's overcrowded classrooms and frequently sub-standard public education systems – particular the state universities - may not be producing the skills needed for a modern economy. And are there jobs for all these young people? Is there space for all the homes that will need to be built?

### **Recent changes**

Looking at Africa's lack of progress over the 1980s and 1990s, these are valid questions. But since 2000 things have changed. The problems of negative economic growth, poor leadership and nasty civil wars have begun to give way to a different, more peaceful, Africa. Until the year 2000 Africa's economic growth rates barely kept up with population growth. Today many countries are three or four percent ahead of population growth, with some even higher. Africa is certainly changing at an extraordinary pace and issues that seemed crucial a few years ago – such as the killer AIDS - have faded, while others, ironically including population growth, have become more urgent. Combined with climate change and governance, population growth and youth will be the main issues facing Africa in the next decades.

And it may not be all bad. Doubling the population of Africa, a continent with plenty of space and resources, could make a huge positive difference. For example we know that people who live in towns are more connected to the rest of the world through the internet than those who live in rural areas. Africans are getting connected at an incremental rate. In 1999 there were about two million internet users in Africa; now there are 140. This means young Africans will be a lot better informed about their country and the world than their parents were. In Africa only Ethiopia tries – and succeeds - in blocking opposition websites and other information that might lead to dissident activity. Most Africans will know a lot more about what is really going on their countries than their parents did.

Hundreds of young Africans still reckon that their best route out of poverty and a dead end life is to head north and somehow try to get to Europe. They are disillusioned with the prospects in their own country and are prepared to gamble everything, including their lives – several times in some cases – just to get to Europe or America and start a new life. But these numbers appear to be dropping, perhaps as real economic opportunities open up at home.

### **Future scenarios**

One scenario is that Africa will stagger on, continuing to fill most of the lowest places in all the measurements of human success and well-being. Young people will be passive and subservient, not daring to challenge their parents and elders. They will be bound by traditional ethnic customs and loyalties. Their prime loyalty will be to their family and then their ethnic group. National leaders will not command their respect and their nation will not command their loyalty or obedience. When they hear stories about corrupt politicians and foreign companies they will shrug. They will stay silent, join churches and hope that God will help them.

But there is another – more likely – scenario: a generation will come through more focused and better connected to each other, sharing ambitions and values. They will seek true and important information, gradually establishing a continent-wide network amongst themselves. They will be motivated by the evils done to Africa, for example between 30% and 50% of Africa's oil revenues are said to be leaking out the continent, stolen and sent to tax havens. The new generation will let ethnicity, and even nationalism, be subsumed by a continent-wide ideology which will create positive and hopeful scenarios. They will be intolerant of this generation's corruption. The zeitgeist will be angry, a message perhaps derived from a line in Bob Marley's Exodus: "We know where we're going. We know where we're from". Only this will not be an exodus from Africa, it will be an exodus from the Africa that has held them up for so long: the selfish leadership, the corruption, the theft of public goods, the poor schools.

A rapidly rising population where those under 25 constitute two fifths of Africa's two billion people, fired by a vision of how the continent could be, united through the web and the simple idea of making Africa a good place to live: it might just happen.

### **Implications for UK policy**

The implications for UK policy? In the short term we should engage more closely with Africa, economically and politically. Africa is not just about aid. The UK should put more resources into understanding what is going on. Too many diplomats and aid workers live in an air conditioned bubble and do not get to meet real people and do not always pick up shifts in public mood. A lot more effort should go into studying the dynamics of African societies. So that if – or when – there is sudden rapid change, there is a real understanding of what is happening. We have seen how relatively small assistance, humanitarian in the cases of impending famine, and military in the case of Sierra Leone in 2000, based on good understanding and timing can make all the difference in the long run.

## Africa and the Strategic Defence and Security Review

*General Sir David Richards GCB CBE DSO ADC Gen, Chief of the Defence Staff*

Engagement in Africa is a priority for the United Kingdom. The decades of interaction, through families, trade and friendship are evident in our support for Somalia, partnership with Kenya and commitment to Sierra Leone.

The United Kingdom's defence effort is being reshaped by the Strategic Defence and Security Review. In themselves I expect these changes to have little impact on Defence's engagement in Africa. We continue to send some 10,000 soldiers a year, mostly infantry, to Kenya for extensive field training as part of their preparation for operations. Royal Navy vessels call regularly in African ports. We have maintained permanent training teams in Pretoria, Nairobi, Freetown and Abuja. These help African states build their own capabilities to take military action to secure peace and stability collectively. We continue to send short-term training teams to assist a number of states to the same end, as well as to develop their own higher management of defence and to build counter-terrorism capacity.

### **Evolving circumstances**

Where there have been changes, they have been driven by evolving circumstances, not by resources. For example, the growing importance attached to success in Somalia caused us to extend our engagement with Uganda, both in supporting the training of troops deploying to the African Union's mission AMISOM and in mentoring campaign planning skills. Our support to the AMISOM mission is central to generating the combat power that the Ugandan Armed Forces display on a daily basis.

Circumstances always change over time. My own experience commanding an intervention in Sierra Leone is a case in point. Although initially sent to evacuate British entitled individuals from Freetown it was clear that our mandate could, and should, become broader. That led to the UK playing a pivotal role in stabilising the UN Force and turning the tide of war against the militias. Our engagement did not end there. Since the war which led to the restoration of legal government, the UK has been instrumental in reforming the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces to become the capable combat force they are today – to the extent that the government of Sierra Leone has been able to decide to commit troops to serve in AMISOM alongside Uganda, Kenya, Burundi and Djibouti, confident that they will acquit themselves professionally and honourably in the field.

But a military deployment was not all that the UK offered in Sierra Leone. Like all our best relationships around the continent, our actions in Freetown were part of an interlocking patchwork of projects by the MOD, DFID and the FCO. We are at our best when we work with other government departments combining development, political and military assistance, and indeed when the United Kingdom coordinates its efforts with those of other international partners. This is a pattern which we attempt to replicate widely.

## **Building stability**

From a military perspective the position in Africa remains as it has always been: the Armed Forces give the government of the day a range of options. Which it chooses depends on their relative utility and cost-effectiveness. In Africa, the most likely use of the military is in capacity building though in Sierra Leone a more robust approach was initially required. It is much more likely that the Armed Forces will be employed in capacity building. As the Building Stability Overseas (BSO) Strategy made clear last year, we know that states cannot be stable without functioning security and justice systems, and that effective and accountable armed forces are a vital part of such systems. Defence engagement contributes to the BSO Strategy as part of the tri-departmental Africa Conflict Pool Programme, alongside the FCO and DFID, reinforcing the joint working I highlight above. In this way defence engagement becomes a key tool of conflict prevention, but it is just one tool and others may meet the government's objectives.

## **Current economic constraints**

We have all recognised that the current economic constraints mean we must cut our force size to meet our budget but we will not allow that to undermine our strategic goals. One of these is supporting our friends and allies around the world. Another is addressing conflict issues worldwide. Both are particularly important in Africa where we have such deep bonds, not just historically but today with family ties that reach from the UK to every part of the continent.

In practice capacity building tasks do not require large numbers of people so the Government's options in Africa are unlikely to be constrained by reductions in Service manpower. As we revise the force structures in all three Services for the longer term we are building in scope for enhancing defence engagement activities. This is most obviously the case in Army 2020 which will give us new options to generate forces for such small-scale activities.

Finally, deciding whether and how to act, be it with military instruments or any other, requires a sophisticated understanding of the problem and a clear idea of what you wish to achieve. In the UK we are making considerable efforts to improve our capability to do the necessary planning across Whitehall and in conjunction with regional and international partners. Africa matters to the UK and the Armed Forces are a key part of our determination to help our many friends there.

## **Climate Change and Security in Africa**

*Dan Smith, Secretary General, International Alert*

Climate change has been identified as contributing to insecurity in several areas of Africa – the Horn, the Niger basin, the southern Sahel, the Great Lakes region and southern Africa. The Karamoja Cattle Corridor in Uganda, for example, offers several instances of competition over scarce pasture and water. Pastoralists in Ethiopia face similar issues; traditional coping measures to deal with changes in the length and timing of the rainy season are less effective than in the past simply because there are more people and more animals, producing increased pressure, and an increased risk of conflict, at the moment when resources are scarce.

As these examples indicate, the equation of insecurity starts with water security, which is decisively affected by climate, and determines the security of both food and energy supply. When water security declines, human security deteriorates. Multiply that by the social dimension. An extreme weather event is a natural disaster only if it affects the vulnerable. Add to this the quality of governance institutions and their arrangements to address vulnerability, which will vary according to their efficiency, integrity and representativeness. In the Matabeleland-North Province in Zimbabwe for example, a combination of poor governance, polarisation between social groups and economic challenges are combining with climate change to increase the potential for conflict.

Overall, low income, poorly governed countries will be the worst hit by climatic pressures and the poorest of the poor will suffer most. The pressures from climate change pile vulnerability on top of existing vulnerability to conflict and violence in multiple layers of insecurity. Some of these pressures may explode into violent conflict, some local and relatively low-level, some potentially more widely destructive. Addressing climate change is therefore critical to addressing the multiple causes of instability.

### **Adaptation and resilience**

The best long-term bet is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But even with the best global agreement, even reached and implemented immediately, the pent up effects of global warming would still unfold for three to four decades. Interacting with inequality and poor governance, consequent risks of heightened insecurity will persist. So even in the best of circumstances, there will need to be adaptation to climate change. And developing countries will need assistance.

There is a possible double benefit. Resilience to one challenge can build resilience to others. Studies in the Niger Basin and the Horn report that being able to handle conflicts is an important part of adapting to climate change effectively and that adapting effectively builds good relations between groups. This is the essence of resilience.

The point is that adaptation is not purely a technical question. Before the Limpopo flooding of 2000 in Mozambique, expert warning of imminent floods was rejected by



village leaders whose main early warning signal was the migration of ants. But when the waters came, they came too fast for the ants to react. The consequences were tragic as about 700 people drowned.

What mattered was not just the accuracy of the information but the legitimacy of the information provider. Research in the Niger Basin, the Great Lakes and Horn confirms that local level institutions often seem to receive a degree of trust that is not given to provincial or national government. The emphasis has to be on helping communities and societies to develop resilient networks, relationships and means of communication so that the necessary technical measures can be identified, discussed, communicated and implemented.

### **Mal-adaptation and insecurity**

However, not all measures of adaptation will be positive for security. Again, issues of social position and power are central.

For pastoralists in Ethiopia, two major issues are the increased frequency of severe droughts and the changed timing and length of the rainy season. Pastoralists' primary adaptive strategy against these changes is their mobility, as it always has been. But these days there are more people with more animals competing for the use of smaller pastures and less water. That produces greater conflict. Thus, an adaptive strategy that used to be an alternative to conflict becomes a cause of it. And when governments try to regulate pastoralists' movement through administrative boundaries, some clans gain more (or at least are seen to gain more) than others, generating grievances. In other words, a conflict resolution strategy attempting to address a problem produced by a conflict avoiding strategy might instead exacerbate the conflict.

These problems are serious locally, but their geographic spread is limited. That may change, however. Climate change will generate fluctuations in water supply, in turn affecting land values, and thus offering money-making opportunities to the rich and resourceful. Similarly, adaptation holds further opportunity for money-making, both licit and illicit, because it includes the provision of goods and services through government contracts. The stakes are high; the UN has estimated global financing needs for adaptation at \$50-175 billion while independent estimates are twice as much. In fragile states, rapacious elites would be untrue to themselves were they not to divert adaptation funding to their own ends; it may not be taking it too far to say that in the worst case, the poor will have to develop resilience against the effects of adaptation funding along with everything else. This could fuel tensions, increasing the chances of violence.

### **Policy directions**

There is a combined policy approach available here with a double benefit – to give a central place in overseas development assistance (ODA) for fragile states to develop resilience through a combination of climate response and peacebuilding.

Supporting the ability of the local population to adapt is often more appropriate than funding big, nationally defined adaptation measures. The combined task of responding to climate stresses and reducing the risk of conflict requires action at

multiple levels – household, village, provincial, national and international. Drill down into examples of successful adaptation and resilience and the local level always emerges as necessary – but is not itself sufficient and, of course, local measures can also go awry.

From this, three points emerge for UK policy:

1. International action to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions;
2. Threading resilience (i.e. adaptation and peacebuilding) into development assistance;
3. Targeting ODA to supporting local level responses in regions prioritised by climate and conflict criteria.

UK policy has pressed on the first point for the past several years under successive governments and that must continue. On the second point the work has begun but has not fed through into most development programming. DFID deserves political support – and probably needs a bit of a push – for this. On the third point, there is increasing consciousness of the importance of this but it is the kind of policy that is always in danger of falling between two or three bureaucratic stools and would therefore particularly benefit from constructive parliamentary interest.

Climate change adds to a whole range of other factors in increasing the risks of insecurity in Africa and elsewhere, but the good news is that approaches to address climate change often have the benefit of contributing to peacebuilding efforts. Attempts to address climate change and attempts to address insecurity must go hand in hand.

## **British Government Policies, Africa and Security**

*Myles A. Wickstead CBE, Visiting Professor in International Relations, Open University and Special Advisor to the Parliamentary International Development Select Committee*

There are a number of very obvious ways in which the UK can contribute to creating a safer, more secure Africa. These include the exercise of 'hard power' – intervening physically under certain conditions, as in Sierra Leone a decade ago – or 'soft power', through continuing to support Africa's economic development and helping to create the conditions under which people feel that they can progress towards achieving fulfilling lives for themselves and their families.

This essay is not about the first of those. Nor is it about supporting the private sector, which is generally and increasingly recognised as the key engine of growth which will drive Africa's development – and the British Government has a crucial role in that, both by helping African Governments create the right regulatory environment to encourage foreign investors and directly encouraging British investors to look at Africa as a potential, vibrant new market.

A Continent which is growing fast and sustainably in economic terms; which provides equitable and inclusive opportunities; which is able to provide jobs for its rapidly growing younger population; which embraces ethnic and religious diversity – this is the paradigm for a stable and secure Africa. There are three areas of public policy over which the British Government has control or in which it is able to exert political leadership which are crucial to the fulfilment of this aspiration.

### **Development assistance**

The first is official development assistance (ODA). It matters less than it did as it becomes a smaller percentage of the budget in most countries as their economies grow, and as Africa is able to look increasingly to alternative sources of concessional finance or to an increasingly engaged domestic and foreign investment community; but it matters nevertheless, and remains very important in some circumstances. The British Government scores highly here; the quality of its programme is much admired, and its commitment to achieve the 0.7% ODA target in 2013, especially given the gloomy financial outlook, is wholly admirable - a view shared by most of the international community, inside and outside Africa.

### **Global public goods**

The second is on what we might call 'global public goods' – not a phrase that trips off the tongue easily, but which is nevertheless increasingly important. The most obvious example of this is climate change and environmental issues, recently under the microscope in Rio. Africa, the Continent least responsible for bringing about these changes, is potentially the Continent which will be the most seriously affected, for example as a result of global warming, which will impact on the availability of fresh water and the fertility of agricultural land, and displace large numbers of people in coastal areas as a consequence of rising sea levels. The implications of this

for security – increasing numbers of desperate people with their livelihoods undermined, and growing pressures for migration within and beyond the Continent – are self-evident.

There is real potential for the UK to exert a real leadership role in these areas over the next two or three years, which began in Rio with the Deputy Prime Minister's support for a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Prime Minister's role as a member of the High Level Panel on what should succeed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), combined with the UK Presidency of the G8 in 2013, provides a powerful opportunity to build on this and make it clear that the UK wants to see the SDGs integrated into the MDG process (they have proceeded on parallel tracks for 20 years, which is two decades too long) and will encourage those countries which have done the most polluting to support those who will bear the greatest consequences.

### **Policies affecting Africa**

The third area is those policies which affect countries in the developing world, and Africa in particular, negatively. The UK and the EU are not alone in falling short in this area. Heavy cotton subsidies to US farmers in the south of the US undermine poor cotton farmers in the Ivory Coast. Agricultural subsidies in the EU undermine dairy farmers in Africa; where is the logic or justice (for African farmers or for European taxpayers) in every European cow being subsidised to the tune of \$2.50 per day – twice as much as \$1.25, which we define as the absolute poverty level below which many millions of people in the developing world still live?

Of course it is the intention of those policies to satisfy domestic constituencies and not to undermine livelihoods and help to keep people in poverty. But that is their effect. They are wrong, and they are potentially destabilising and risk creating insecurity. International development goes beyond – a long way beyond – aid. The UK has an opportunity to demonstrate a real commitment to a 'whole of Government' approach to international development over the coming years; that would be in the best interest - including the security interest - of both Africa and the UK. The jury is out...



# Africa All Party Parliamentary Group

The Africa All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) was established in 2003 by Hugh Bayley MP and Lord Lea of Crondall. Its purpose is to raise the profile of Africa and pan-African issues in Westminster.

The current officers of the Africa APPG are:

<b>President:</b>	Lord Steel of Aikwood
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The Group has a membership of over 150 MPs and Peers. The administrative costs are covered by the Royal African Society ([www.royalafricansociety.org](http://www.royalafricansociety.org)).

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